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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the adoption in 1919 of the Revenue Act of 1918, damages
received on account of personal injuries or sickness have been excluded by
statute from gross income.' This exclusion, which does not apply to reim-
bursements for medical expenses for which the taxpayer was previously
allowed a tax deduction,2 is presently set forth in section 104(a)(2). One
might expect that a provision having recently attained the ripe age of 75 years
without change in its basic language would have a settled meaning. However,
recent litigation under section 104(a)(2) bristles with unsettled issues. Does
the exclusion apply to punitive damages? To prejudgment interest included
in a personal injury recovery? To recoveries under various antidiscrimination
statutes?
The Supreme Court entered the fray in 1992 with its decision in
United States v. Burke,3 dealing with the application of section 104(a)(2) to
recoveries in employment discrimination cases. The Court followed a
regulation stating that the exclusion applies only to amounts received, through
suit or settlement, "based upon tort or tort-type rights,"' and held that a
claim is tort or tort-type only if it can be redressed by a broad range of
damages, such as those traditionally allowed in tort cases. Specifically, the
Court found that a recovery under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1984
was not within the section 104(a)(2) exclusion because Title VII, as it existed
when the facts of the case arose, allowed only equitable relief and recoveries
of backpay.
If the Court believed that the Burke decision would bring order to this
comer of the law, it was sadly mistaken. Just how broad must the range of
recoverable damages be to make a claim tort or tort-type under Burke? Is a
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)-
which allows recovery of backpay plus, in cases where the employer's
violation is willful, an equal amount as "liquidated damages"-tort-type? Did
the Court mean to say that the exclusion applies to all damages received on
a tort or tort-type claim, including punitive damages and prejudgment interest,
or only to compensation for the personal injury that gave rise to the claim?
The Court has granted certiorari in a case involving the excludability of
ADEA recoveries,5 and, depending on the scope and clarity of its opinion in
1. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b)(6). 40 Stat. 1057, 1066
(1919).
2. IRC § 104(a); Regs. § 1.104-1(a).
3. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
4. Regs. § 1.104-1(c).
5. Schleier v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 507
(1994).
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that case, it may find it necessary to hear additional cases to settle other
issues on which the lower courts have not agreed.
A principal purpose of this article is to suggest that these questions
should be resolved with a close eye on the history of section 104(a)(2) and
the policies supporting it. Part II is a brief discussion of the history of the tax
treatment of damages received for a personal injury. Part III is a discussion
of policy justifications for excluding from gross income compensatory
damages for personal injuries and the absence of any policy justification for
excluding punitive damages. This Part also examines the policy justification
for excluding that portion of a personal injury recovery that compensates for
lost wages or profits. Part IV discusses the Supreme Court's decision in
Burke and the decision's effect in subsequent litigation. Part V discusses
punitive damages and sets forth the author's reasons for concluding that all
punitive damages are included in income. Part VI examines whether damages
(including liquidated damages) obtained under the ADEA are within the
section 104(a) exclusion. The final Part VII briefly discusses the problems
inherent in extension of the exclusion to all tort-type claims arising from a
personal injury and whether that extension has led to inappropriate results.
II. HISTORY
A. Generally
The Treasury initially took the position that damages received for
personal injury are gross income, analogizing them to the proceeds of
accident insurance, which the Treasury assumed to be taxable.6 However, in
1918, the Attorney General issued an opinion concluding that accident
insurance proceeds are not taxable because they constitute a kind of conver-
sion of human capital caused by the injury.7 As a consequence of the
Attorney General's opinion, the Treasury promptly revoked the regulation that
declared personal injury damages to be taxable, holding instead that "an
6. "[An a]mount received as the result of a suit or compromise for personal injury,
being similar to the proceeds of accident insurance, is to be accounted for as income." Reg.
33, art. 4, Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 8 (1918).
The history of § 104(a)(2) is recounted in several articles. E.g., Margaret Henning,
Recent Developments in the Tax Treatment of Personal Injury and Punitive Damage
Recoveries, 45 Tax Law. 783, 784-95 (1992); James C. Moser, Jr., Note, Miller v. Commis-
sioner. The Expanding Scope of the I.R.C. Section 104(a)(2) Exclusion "On Account of
Personal Injuries," 44 Ark. L. Rev. 167, 173-82 (1991).
7. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 308 (1918). The Attorney General's opinion was
apparently based on Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918), where the Court
defined "income" as "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined."
[Vol. 2:6
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amount received by an individual as the result of a suit or compromise for
personal injuries sustained by him through accident" is not gross income.'
The Revenue Act of 1918, enacted in 1919, included a provision
excluding from gross income "[a]mounts received, through accident or health
insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for
personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received
whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness."9 The
Ways and Means Committee Report on this provision stated:
Under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts re-
ceived through accident or health insurance, or under
workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal
injury or sickness, and damages received on account of such
injuries or sickness, are required to be included in gross
income. The proposed bill provides that such amounts shall
not be included in gross income.'
0
Thus, the first statutory antecedent of section 104(a)(2) was adopted in order
to codify what Congress believed to be the state of the law at that time and
to eliminate the possibility that case law would follow a different path.
The Service initially concluded that the statutory exclusion applied
only to damages for physical injuries and that damages for nonphysical
personal injuries were taxable." However, the Service repudiated that view
only a few years later and acknowledged that damages (or a settlement
payment) for an invasion of a personal right (e.g., defamation or alienation
of affection) was not taxable because such receipts are not gain to the
taxpayer.12 The Board of Tax Appeals (the predecessor of the Tax Court)
similarly determined that apart from the statutory exclusion, damages for
defamation are not gross income because, in the court's view, the term
"income" does not encompass them. 3 The Service acquiesced in that
8. T.D. 2747, Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
9. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b)(6). 40 Stat. 1057, 1066
(1919).
10. H.R. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918). reprinted in 1939-1 (Part
2) C.B. 86, 92.
11. E.g., Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920) (holding that damages for alienation of
affections (although a personal injury) are taxable); Sol. Mem. 957, 1 C.B. 65 (1919) (holding
taxable damages for defamation).
12. Sol. Op. 132, I-I C.B. 92 (1922). superseded by Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B.
33 (holding also that damages received for alienation of affections or for custody of a child
are excluded from income).
13. Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1024 (1927). acq.. VI-I C.B. 14
(1928). The Hawkins opinion implies that if the taxpayer had received punitive damages, they
would have been taxable. Since the factual events of the case arose before the effective date
19951
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decision, thereby reaffirming its acceptance of the excludability of damages
for nonphysical personal injuries.
The exclusion of damages for nonphysical injuries thus was initially
grounded on a construction of the term "income" (as employed in the
Revenue Acts) rather than on the statutory antecedent to section 104(a)(2).
The determination that such damages are within the statutory exclusion for
personal injuries came later. Indeed, it was some 45 years later that the courts
and the Service held that the statutory exclusion of damages for personal
injuries applied equally to physical and nonphysical injuries. 14 Any lingering
doubt about the issue was laid to rest by the Supreme Court in its 1992
Burke15 decision in which a majority of the Supreme Court held section
104(a)(2) applicable to damages for nonphysical personal injuries and rejected
the contrary suggestion made by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion.
B. Punitive Damages
The tax treatment of punitive damages has a history of its own. In the
1920 decision in Eisner v. Macomber, the Supreme Court adopted the
circumscribing definition of "income" as "gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined."' 6 For some years thereafter, that definition
was strictly applied, excluding from gross income any gain not derived from
capital or labor. Windfall income (including punitive damages), not being
derived from capital or labor, was generally held to be exempt from tax. 7
Accordingly, punitive damages were not taxed until the Supreme Court
abandoned the "capital or labor" requirement in its 1955 decision in
Glenshaw Glass, deciding instead that gross income included, at a minimum,
all "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have complete dominion."' 8 The characterization of income as
derived from capital or labor was useful, according to the Glenshaw Glass
Court, but it is not a delimiting definition of that term. The Court held that
of the 1918 Revenue Act, the court did not pass upon or even discuss the application of the
statutory exclusion to nonphysical personal injuries.
14. See Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32 (1972), acq., 1972-2 C.B. 3. Until 1955,
it made little difference whether the exclusion was the product of a statutory exclusion or a
narrow construction of the term "income." However, when the meaning of that term was
broadened by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426
(1955), it became important whether nonphysical injuries were within the § 104(a)(2)
exclusion.
15. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1871 (1992).
16. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (dealing with the taxation of stock dividends).
17. E.g., Highland Farms Corp. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1314, 1322 (1940), acq.
in result, 1941-1 C.B. 5.
18. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
[Vol 2:6
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exemplary damages received for fraud and punitive damages received for
anti-trust violations were gross income.
After the decision in Glenshaw Glass, the Service asserted that
punitive damages in personal injury actions are also taxable.' 9 However, the
Service reversed course in Revenue Ruling 75-45,20 holding that all damages
on account of personal injury, whether punitive or compensatory, are
excluded from gross income by section 104(a)(2). The ruling dealt with an
award for wrongful death in a state where wrongful death awards were
punitive in nature.2 1 In two cases decided in 1983, the position taken by the
Service in Revenue Ruling 75-45 was deemed by the Tax Court and by the
Ninth Circuit to be a concession that punitive damages are within section
104(a)(2); relying on that concession, those courts excluded punitive damages
from income in cases where the personal injury that gave rise to the
taxpayer's claim qualified for section 104(a)(2) treatment.Y' The opinions in
the cases make clear that the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit rested their
holdings on the Service's concession, and did not make independent determi-
nations of whether that section is applicable.
In Revenue Ruling 84-108,' the Service revoked Revenue Ruling
75-45, holding that punitive damages are not covered by section 104(a)(2)
and are therefore gross income. Revenue Ruling 84-108 dealt with two
situations involving awards for wrongful death. In one situation, state law
limited a wrongful death award to the amount necessary to compensate the
victim's survivors for their pecuniary loss. The Service ruled that these
compensatory awards are excluded from gross income by section 104(a)(2).
The second situation involved a state law under which wrongful death
damages were determined by the degree of fault of the tortfeasor, rather than
the amount of loss incurred. The Service classified these damages as punitive,
and since punitive damages add to a taxpayer's wealth rather than compensat-
ing for loss, it held them to be taxable.
19. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18, superseded by Rev. Rul. 85-98. 1985-2 C.B.
51.
20. 1975-1 C.B. 47, revoked by Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
21. While the ruling does not state why wrongful death awards in that state were
classified as punitive, it is likely that the amount of the award was based on the degree of the
tortfeasor's culpability, rather than the extent of the loss suffered by the victim and the
victim's family. See Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 34.
22. Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1110 n.7 (1983): Roemer v. Commis-
sioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983).
23. 1984-2 C.B. 32. For an analysis of the positions taken by the Commissioner in
the 1975 and 1984 rulings, and the courts' construction of the 1975 ruling, see Mary J.
Morrison, Getting a Rule Right and Writing a Wrong Rule: The IRS Demands a Return on All
Punitive Damages, 17 Conn. L. Rev. 39 (1984).
19951
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In 1989, in Miller v. Commissioner,24 the Tax Court, by a vote of
16 to 2, rejected the reasoning of Revenue Ruling 84-108 and held that
punitive damages obtained in connection with a personal injury claim are
within the section 104(a)(2) exclusion. The court held that the reference in
section 104(a)(2) to "any damages" means all damages, including punitive
damages. While the statute requires that the damages be received "on account
of personal injuries or sickness," the court construed that requirement as
demanding no more than that there be a causal connection between the
damages claim and a personal injury. The court noted that most jurisdictions
allow punitive damages only to claimants who suffered actual injuries. It
concluded that since an actual injury is a prerequisite to a punitive damages
award, such damages are on account of that injury, and if the underlying
injury is personal, section 104(a)(2) applies to the punitive damages.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's
decision in Miller, holding that the presence of a causal link between a
personal injury and an award of punitive damages does not satisfy the
statutory requirement that the damages be "on account of" a personal injury.
According to the court, there must be more than a "but for" causal relation-
ship; the presence of a personal injury must be "sufficient" in itself to qualify
the taxpayer to receive the damages." In other words, section 104(a)(2)
applies only if the personal injury is "sufficient," and not merely "necessary,"
to obtain the damages. Even if punitive damages are awarded only when there
is an actual injury, they are not given unless the tortfeasor's actions are
especially reprehensible. The presence of a personal injury therefore is not
sufficient, and, in the court's view, punitive damages are therefore taxable.
Section 7641 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989
amended section 104(a) to preclude the exclusion of punitive damages
received in connection with a claim not involving physical injury or sick-
ness.26 The legislation was adopted after the Tax Court's decision in Miller
but before the Fourth Circuit reversed that decision.27 Subject to certain
24. 93 T.C. 330, 340 (1989) (reviewed by the court), rev'd sub nom. Commissioner
v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
25. Miller, 914 F.2d at 589-90.
26. Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641, 103 Stat. 2379 (1989).
27. The Tax Court's decision in Miller was issued on September 13, 1989, and the
Fourth Circuit reversed on September 21, 1990. Neither the House Bill nor the Senate Bill of
the 1989 Act contained a provision dealing with punitive damages as such. H.R. 3299, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 1750, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The provision addressing
punitive damages came out of the Conference Committee. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 386, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 622-23 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3018, 3225-26. The House Bill
was introduced on September 20, 1989, and was passed by the House on October 5, 1989.
H.R. Rep. No. 147, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906. The
Conference Committee's version of the Bill (which was adopted by the Congress and which
[Vol 2:6
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transitional rules, the amendment applies to amounts received after July 10,
1989. The amendment makes no reference to punitive damages connected
with a physical injury, whether received before or after July 10, 1989, and the
taxation of these damages is one of the principal topics of this article.
As of this writing, no court has passed on the taxability of punitive
damages received in a personal injury case after July 10, 1989, but several
cases decided since 1989 have involved punitive damages received before that
date. Three Courts of Appeals (the Fourth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits) have
held that punitive damages are taxable,' but the Sixth Circuit has held them
to be excluded by section 104(a)(2). -9 Also, several lower court decisions
have divided on this issue, and two of them are pending on appeal.30
C. Prejudgment Interest
The exclusion of compensatory damages for personal injury encom-
passes any portion of the damages that compensates the victim for lost
income.31 The exclusion applies both to replacements of lost past income
and to amounts received to compensate for diminished future earning capacity
resulting from the personal injury. It has not yet been resolved whether the
exclusion also applies to prejudgment interest-an amount received to
compensate for potential income that was lost because the taxpayer was not
able to invest or use the awarded damages during the period between the time
was the first version to deal with punitive damages) was promulgated on November 21, 1989.
The history of this legislation is described in greater detail later in this article. See infra Part
V.A.I.
28. Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir.) (2-1 decision), ccrt. denied,
115 S. CL 648 (1994); Reese v. Commissioner, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Commissioner
v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
29. Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994) (2-1 decision).
30. E.g., Estate of Wesson v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 1119 (D. Miss. 1994)
(holding that punitive damages in an action for bad faith are taxable): O'Gilvie v. United
States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) T 50,567, 71 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 93-547 (D. Kan. 1992)
(O'Gilvie I1) (holding that punitive damages in a wrongful death case are excluded from gross
income by § 104(a)(2)). Those cases have been appealed to the Fifth and Tenth Circuits.
Compare Rice v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (holding punitive damages
taxable), and Kemp v. Commissioner, 771 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (same), with Horton
v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93 (1993) (reviewed by the court) (holding that punitive damages
arising from personal injury are excluded by § 104(a)(2)), aff'd. 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994)
(2-1 decision), and Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634, 637 (1993) (Downey 11)
(suggesting that punitive damages are not taxable), rev'd. 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), petition
for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1994) (No. 94-999).
31. Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50.
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of the injury (or the time that suit was filed) and the time of the judgment
against the tortfeasor.32
D. Damages for Defamation
The Service maintained for a brief period that damages for defama-
tion of an individual's business or professional reputation (as contrasted to
personal reputation) was taxable.33 While the Service enjoyed a fleeting
success on that issue in a 1982 Tax Court decision, the decision was reversed
on appeal,34 and the subsequent cases (including decisions of three Courts
of Appeal) repudiated that view. 3' The Tax Court itself, in a later case
reviewed by the entire court (Threlkeld), overruled its prior decision and
accepted the view that such damages are excluded from income whether the
defamed reputation is business or personal.36 In Threlkeld, the Tax Court
stated that section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income compensatory
damages "received on account of any invasion of the rights that an individual
is granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of the law., 37 The crucial
test is whether the injury is a "personal injury." The court further stated: "To
determine whether the injury complained of is personal, we must look to the
origin and character of the claim ... and not to the consequences that result
from the injury. 38 It is now settled that it is the nature of the taxpayer's
claim that determines whether damages are excluded from income.
An injury to an individual's reputation damages a personal attribute
of the individual, and the fact that a decline in reputation results in a loss of
income or profits is merely one manifestation of that injury. If a taxpayer
32. Compare Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 124 (1993) (reviewed by the court)
(holding that prejudgment interest is taxable), aff'd (without published opinion), 25 F.3d 1048
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 424 (1994), with Brabson v. United States, 859 F. Supp.
1360 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding that prejudgment interest is excluded from income). These cases
are discussed later in this article. See also Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir.
1994) (suggesting that prejudgment interest is taxable). Cf. Pagliarulo v. Commissioner, 68
T.C. Memo (CCH) 9171, T.C. Memo (P-H) 94,506 (1994) (holding that interest on a
workmen's compensation award is taxable).
33. See Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55.
34. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir.
1983).
35. Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989), aff'g 89 T.C. 632
(1987); Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988); Bent v. Commissioner, 835
F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987), affg 87 T.C. 236 (1986).
36. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986) (reviewed by the court), aff'd,
848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988). The case involved a recovery for injury to the taxpayer's
professional reputation caused by malicious prosecution.
37. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1308.
38. Id. at 1299 (citation omitted).
[Vol 2:6
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loses a limb in an accident, all damages received for the injury are excluded
from income, even to the extent they are received in substitution of items that
would have been taxable if the individual had earned and received them (such
as lost wages or profits). The most obvious difference between a taxpayer
losing a limb and a taxpayer whose reputation is damaged is that the former
suffers a physical injury, while the latter's injury is not physical. The effect
of the exclusion of compensatory damages for defamation of an individual's
professional or business reputation is to accord the same treatment to
damages, whether the injury is physical or nonphysical. Nevertheless, there
is a question whether it is good tax policy to exclude damages for nonphysi-
cal injuries. That issue is discussed in Parts II and II of this article.
E. Damages for Discrimination
A related, widely litigated issue is whether damages received by
victims of discrimination are excluded from income by section 104(a)(2). The
Service initially took the position that such damages are taxable because they
are merely a substitute for lost income.39 Before 1986, the Service was
generally successful in litigating that position,"O but the results since then
have been mixed.4 ' A key authority on this issue is the Supreme Court's
1992 decision in United States v. Burke,42 which involved the applicability
of section 104(a)(2) to damages received under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1984 because of sex discrimination. The damages at issue in Burke
were for back wages lost by the taxpayers because of the employer's dis-
criminatory acts.
According to the regulations under section 104(a)(2), the term
"'damages received'.. . means an amount received... through prosecution
of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort-type rights, or through a
settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution." '  Only
damages (or settlements) received pursuant to a claim that qualifies as a tort
or a tort-type right can be excluded under section 104(a)(2). The exclusion
does not apply to recoveries for violations of rights more accurately described
39. Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32.
40. E.g., Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 616 (1975); Coats v. Commissioner, 36
T.C. Memo (CCH) 1650, T.C. Memo (P-H) 77,407 (1977), aff'd by court order, 626 F.2d
865 (9th Cir. 1980).
41. E.g., Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990). Rickel v.
Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990); Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150 (1991)
(Downey I), aff'd on reconsideration, 100 T.C. 634 (1993) (reviewed by the court) (Downey
RI), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Dec.
5, 1994) (No. 94-999).
42. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
43. Regs. § 1.104-1(c).
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as contract rights.4 For that reason, several courts, including the Supreme
Court, have held that a crucial step in applying section 104(a)(2) is determin-
ing the nature of the claim underlying the taxpayer's damages or a settlement.
In Burke, the Supreme Court held that the characterization of a claim
as tort or tort-type depends upon the breadth of the remedies for such claims.
The common law (and present state laws) permit a wide range of remedies
for tort victims. Recovery is allowed for lost wages or profits, medical
expenses, and diminished future earning capacity. In addition to recoveries
for pecuniary losses, recovery is also permitted for such nonpecuniary items
as pain and suffering, emotional or mental distress, and personal humiliation.
Punitive or exemplary damages are generally available if the wrongdoer's
conduct was intentional or reckless. The Court held that if the remedies for
a violation of an individual's rights are significantly narrower than those
typically available to tort victims, damages or a settlement obtained for the
violation is not based on a tort or tort-type claim, and the amounts received
are taxable.
At the time of the facts of Burke, the remedies for Title VII violations
were restricted to compensation for lost wages and equitable relief, including
reinstatement or elevation to a job. The Court found that the range of
damages then available to a claimant under Title VII was too restricted to
qualify the claims as tort or tort-type claims, and it held the taxpayers'
damages to be taxable. The Court contrasted the remedies then provided by
Title VII with the broad range of remedies under other antidiscrimination
statutes, including the remedies under 42 U.S.C. section 1981 for victims of
race-based employment discrimination. The Court noted that Title VII was
amended in 1991 to expand the available remedies, but because the facts of
the Burke case arose before the effective date of that amendment, the Court
did not pass upon the treatment of damages in cases governed by the
amended statute.
Two types of discrimination are proscribed by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.41 One type is a "disparate treatment" violation-where
an employer intentionally discriminated against an individual, with respect to
compensation or other employment terms, because of the individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. The second type (a "disparate impact"
violation) consists of facially neutral employment practices, not necessary for
business purposes, that have a disparate impact on persons within a protected
class (e.g., persons within a group classified by race or gender). A violation
44. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1877-78 (Justice Souter concurring).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et. seq.
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of the second type can occur whether or not the employer intended that the
disparate impact occur.46
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added a new provision to Title VII
(section 1981a) that expanded the range of relief available for disparate
treatment violations-intentional acts of discrimination by an employer. In
such cases, compensatory damages can be awarded for nonpecuniary injuries,
and punitive damages are allowable in some cases. This provision does not
apply to disparate impact cases, for which the available relief continues to be
only backpay and equitable relief.
In summary, under the Burke construction of section 104(a)(2),
compensatory damages received by a discrimination victim are excluded only
if the damages claim is of a type that can be redressed by a wide range of
remedies. It is not necessary that a range of remedies actually be awarded to
the taxpayer; it is only necessary that the claim arise under a law that permits
a wide range of remedies. Even if the sole remedy actually awarded to the
taxpayer is back wages, the damages are excluded if the taxpayer's claim
qualifies as a tort or tort-type claim." The Service has acknowledged that
the section 104(a)(2) exclusion covers compensatory damages for race-based
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. section 1981 and compensatory damages
received under the amended version of Title VII for disparate treatment type
of discrimination.' However, damages received under Title VII for disparate
impact violations are taxable because of the limited range of remedies
available for those claims.
The Courts of Appeals are divided over whether compensatory
damages received under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA) are taxable, and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari from the
Fifth Circuit's unpublished decision on that issue in Schleier v. Commission-
er.
49
46. For a discussion of the employment discrimination provisions of Title VII and
of the remedies available to victims of violations of those provisions, see Arthur W. Andrews,
The Taxation of Title VII Victims After the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 46 Tax Law. 755. 768-
70 (1993).
47. Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61.
48. Id. In that ruling, the Service acknowledged that damages under the Americans
With Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213) are excluded from income.
49. 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 507 (1994). The circuit court
split is evidenced by Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that
damages received pursuant to an ADEA claim are taxable), petition for cert. filed. 63 U.S.LW.
3476 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1994) (No. 94-999), and Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that such damages are excluded by § 104(a)(2)), petition for ccri. filed, 63
U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1994) (No. 94-944). This issue is discussed below in Parts IV
and VI.
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m. TAX POLICY
Several rationales have been suggested for the exclusion of personal
injury damages from gross income. In this Part, the author describes and
critiques some of those suggestions and offers his own explanation.
A. Containment of Size of Award
One suggested explanation for the exclusion, which the author does
not believe to be sufficiently credible to justify extensive discussion, is that
the purpose of the provision is to prevent the awarding of exorbitantly large
judgements that, in the absence of the exclusion, might be required to provide
a victim with sufficient after-tax dollars to compensate for the injury.5"
If personal injury damages paid in a lump sum were taxed when
received, there would be a bunching of income in that year. Part of the
damages could possibly be viewed as a replacement of the appreciation of
value in the damaged item that had occurred gradually over many years, and
another part of the damages might be a substitute for the loss of income that
would have been earned over many years if the victim had not been injured.
If the realization of the appreciation of personal rights and the substitution for
several years of income were bunched into one year, the rate of tax would
likely be in the higher brackets. To provide full compensation, the amount
payable to the victim would have to be increased to cover some part of the
tax on the damages, that increase in the damages would itself be taxed and
cause the imposition of even more taxes for which taxable compensation
would be made, and so on. While that is a daunting prospect, there are
several reasons to conclude that the containment of damage awards is not the
object of section 104(a)(2).
In the first place, Congress had no reason to believe that state laws
on tort damages would be adjusted to pass the benefit of the income tax
exclusion to the tortfeasor. In fact, a significant number of states do not do
so. The determination of damages is not influenced by section 104(a) unless
either (1) the trier of facts (often a jury) is informed that an award to the
victim will not be taxed or (2) the calculation of the victim's lost income
takes account of the nontaxability of damages by reducing the loss by the
amount of income tax that the victim would likely have incurred if the
income had been earned rather than lost. State laws are divided on whether
to so inform a jury and whether to reduce damages by the tax liability that
it is estimated the victim would have incurred. A substantial number of states
50. See Edward Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and Non-Tax Policy
Considerations, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 701, 719-22 (1977) (rejecting this suggestion).
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prohibit information about nontaxability from being given to the jury, some
states require it to be given, and some states leave the matter to the discretion
of the trial judge.5 Similarly, the states are divided over whether income
taxes should be taken into account in calculating a victim's lost income.52
While the Supreme Court has required that federal taxes be taken into
account in FELA cases (thereby reducing the size of the awards)," that has
not bound federal courts in cases involving other statutes.-'
Moreover, if there were concern that the taxation of such damages
would create excessively high awards because of bunching problems, the
better solution would be to adopt an income-averaging system rather than to
exclude damages from income.55 If full taxability would overburden tort-
feasors, the exclusion errs more obviously in the other direction, thrusting
portions of the costs of torts on the taxpaying public and compromising one
of the fundamental policies of tort law-to encourage tort-free behavior by
placing on tortfeasors the full costs of their wrongs.
B. Retumn of Human Capital
While there is uncertainty as to precisely what considerations led
Congress to adopt the antecedent to section 104(a)(2), the background history
of the provision suggests that Congress focused on a "return of human
capital" theory. The first pronouncement of an exclusion for personal injury
recoveries was made by the Attorney General in an opinion promulgated in
1918 concerning accident insurance proceeds.- The opinion indicates that
the rationale for the exclusion was that accident insurance proceeds merely
provide a monetary substitution for a personal attribute that was lost as a
consequence of an accident. It seems likely that a similar rationale underlay
the Treasury's 1918 determination that personal injury damages are exclud-
able because the Treasury's reversal of its prior regulatory position was made
51. See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Propriety of Taking Income Tax into
Consideration in Fixing Damages in Personal Injury or Death Action, 16 A.L.RAth 589, 594-
602 (1982).
52. Id. at 605-16.
53. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
54. E.g., Estate of Spinosa v. International Harvester Co., 621 F.2d 1154, 1158 (1st
Cir. 1980). In Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1993). the
court affirmed an award of compensatory damages for age discrimination in employment.
which the lower court determined with a reduction for the income taxes that the plaintiff
would have borne on the lost income.
55. The operation of a typical income-averaging provision is described infra note
81.
56. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 308 (1918).
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in response to the Attorney General's opinion.57 Since the 1919 legislation
that enacted the antecedent to section 104(a)(2) was intended to codify the
positions previously adopted by the Treasury and the Attorney General, it
seems likely that Congress was motivated by the same rationale.58 This
rationale is sometimes described as a "return of capital" or as a "return of
human capital" theory.
The human capital theory has recently been criticized by courts and
by commentators.59 Moreover, even if the theory was the original rationale
for the statutory exclusion, it is not necessary to accept the theory as the
justification for retaining the exclusion. A statute may be adopted for a
reason that is later abandoned, but the statute may be retained for quite
different reasons. Also, legislators may have a strong visceral belief that a
remedy is needed, but not be able to ascertain the principles upon which that
belief is founded. Thus, even when the legislative history sets forth a
rationale for a provision, the rationale actually underlying the legislation may
be something quite different because the legislators are then unable to
articulate the true rationale.
Legal realism teaches that the principle underlying a judicial decision
may be different from the one expressed in the court's opinion. The true
underlying principle may be one that is not fully perceived by the judge when
writing the opinion and is only discovered years later after there has been
experience with a wide variety of factual circumstances to which a common
principle must be applied. The flexibility of the legal system allows the
cumulative wisdom of many judges, gained over time, to uncover the
controlling principle for an issue when that principle may have been intuitive-
ly felt but not fully comprehended by the judges who wrote the opinions in
the earlier cases. This flexibility prevents the law from being held captive to
premature expressions of only dimly comprehended rationalizations, and the
resulting capacity for building on the courts' initial grappling with new issues
is a significant part of the genius of the common law.
The same process of rationalization can take place with legislation,
and the underlying principle for a statute should be determined with the same
flexibility that is applied to judicial decisions. This is especially appropriate
57. See supra note 8.
58. See supra notes 9, 10 and accompanying text. Also, shortly after the statutory
exclusion was enacted, the Service characterized excludable damages as substitutes for lost
personal rights that are not assignable to other persons and cannot be valued since they are not
traded in the market place. Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92 (1922), superseded by Rev. Rul. 74-77,
1977-1 C.B. 33.
59. E.g., Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150, 159 (1991) (reviewed by the court)
(Downey I), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3476
(U.S. Dec. 5, 1994) (No. 94-999); Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir.) (Trott,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 648 (1994); Yorio, supra note 50, at 711-13.
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in light of the fact that a statute is adopted by the combined vote of several
individuals who likely have diverse reasons for their support. It is the
function of the courts and of the government agencies that administer a
provision to reconcile the terms of a statutory provision with the purposes
that it serves and with the overall policies of the larger statutory scheme of
which that individual provision is a part.
For several reasons, the human capital theory, standing alone, does
not adequately justify section 104(a)(2). First, a basic premise of the theo-
ry-that personal injury recoveries should not be taxed because they merely
replace the unascertainable value of what the victim lost-is inconsistent with
the rules generally applied to dispositions of property. On a disposition of
property, gain or loss is measured as the difference between the amount
realized and the taxpayer's basis for the property.' The value of the asset
when sold or destroyed is irrelevant for this purpose. For example, if X owns
a rare vase in which she has a basis of $1,000 when it is destroyed by the
negligence of Y, compensation for the loss received from Y is gain to the
extent it exceeds X's $1,000 basis, without regard to the vase's value. Assume
the vase was worth, say, $50,000 before it was destroyed, but X accepts
$28,000 as compensation for the loss because she believes that she could not
obtain more, given Y's financial resources.6 Even though the compensation
is substantially less than the value of the destroyed item, X recognizes gain
of $27,000 (the difference between the amount received and the vase's basis).
If damages for the loss of personal rights are to be treated differently, the
reason does not lie exclusively in the impossibility of measuring the value of
those rights.
Second, justification for the exclusion does not flow from the
difficulties of determining the basis (if any) that a tort victim has in the body
parts or personal rights that were damaged. A taxpayer has the burden of
establishing basis, 62 and if none can be established, basis is deemed to be
zero. Since people do not anticipate having parts of their bodies (or personal
rights) converted into cash, they do not keep records of any capital expendi-
tures that may have been made in connection therewith, and it might seem
appropriate to accord them relief by excluding all or part of their recover-
ies.6 However, it is highly unlikely that a person has any basis in body
parts. Most expenditures that might conceivably be attributed to body parts
60. IRC § 1001(a).
61. Also, assume X purchases no replacement property. If X reinvested all or part
of the proceeds in replacement property, all or part of her gain would be deferred under
§ 1033.
62. E.g., Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner. 144 F.2d 110. 114 01st Cir.). ccrt.
denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944).
63. See Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 Cornell L Rev. 143, 152 (1992).
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(such as purchases of food, clothing, and medical care) cannot be apportioned
among them on any rational basis. Moreover, to the extent that an allocation
is feasible, amounts allocated to particular parts are usually in the nature of
maintenance and repairs, and such expenditures cannot be capitalized as basis.
Although maintenance and repairs can be deducted only when incurred in
connection with a business or profit venture, 64 they are not capital expendi-
tures, and so are not included in basis, whether or not they were deduct-
ible. 65 It therefore is highly unlikely that anyone has a meaningful basis in
body parts, and it would be overly generous to exclude damages received for
a personal injury solely because of the understandable failure of persons to
keep records of their investment in their bodies.
There is a remote possibility that an individual might have a basis in
some personal rights. For example, a portion of the amounts expended in
obtaining a college or professional education (some portion of which could
conceivably be a capital expenditure) might be included in the basis of a
person's reputation. Even if such an allocation were theoretically justified, no
actual allocation is likely to be made because the problems in determining the
amount to be allocated are mind-boggling. In the case of compensation
received for an injured reputation, one possible solution to the basis problem
would be to arbitrarily exclude from income some part of the compensation.
However, the basis of a taxpayer's reputation would be quite small and would
justify excluding no more than a small amount of compensation. Moreover,
in the normal course of exploiting one's reputation in business or professional
life, no deduction is allowed against the resulting income for the cost of the
reputation expended in earning the income. Finally, as shown later in this
Part, when everything is taken into account, the policy justification for
excluding damages received for nonphysical injuries is much weaker than the
case for physical injuries.
Third, some courts and commentators have suggested that the human
capital theory is undercut by the fact that the section 104(a)(2) exclusion
extends to damages in substitution for lost income.' This is a different point
from the one that the author makes below in asserting that if the human
capital theory were valid and were applied consistently throughout the tax
law, gain from a sale of a personal right would not be taxed. The author does
not share the view that the statutory exclusion of damages for lost income is
inconsistent with the human capital justification. While the recovery of
human capital theory does not support the statutory treatment of damages for
lost income, that treatment is not inconsistent with the theory; rather, it rests
64. Regs. § 1.162-4.
65. See I.T. 4094, 1952-2 C.B. 134 (holding that the cost of repainting a personal
residence is not a proper adjustment to its basis).
66. See, e.g., Yorio, supra note 50, at 712.
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on a separate, independent rationale. The reason for excluding compensation
for lost income is discussed below in Part 1I.E.
This reason does not encompass interest. Section 104(a)(2) was
amended in 1983 to permit personal injury damages to be received in periodic
installments without causing the recipient to be taxed on the interest element
in the deferred receipts. If an interest element were to be segregated and
taxed, the interest portion could be calculated only if Congress settled on a
rate of interest, and the computation might be quite complex if future
installments are contingent. Congress most likely decided against the
imputation of interest on periodic payments of damages in order to avoid the
administrative burden of making those calculations. However, in requiring the
imputation of interest in many other deferred payment contexts, Congress has
not been deterred by the burden of the calculations. The difficulty of making
an imputed interest calculation is of a much lesser order of magnitude than
the difficulty of separating income-related damages from a lump sum damage
award or settlement, as discussed in Part m.E.2 of this article. Rather than
raising questions as to whether there is a discemable purpose underlying
section 104(a)(2), the weakness of the independent justification that underlies
the 1983 amendment merely raises the question of whether the adoption of
that amendment was wise.
The justification for the 1983 amendment, weak as it may be, does
not support an exclusion of prejudgment interest. While the computational
burden of imputing interest on sums payable in periodic installments would
not be overwhelming, it is meaningful. Prejudgment interest, on the other
hand, is at a specified rate for an easily determinable period of time, and the
calculation of the amount of that interest presents no difficulty.
Finally, and most significantly, the human capital rationale does not
jibe with the tax law's treatment of voluntary dispositions of human capital.
The section 104(a)(2) exclusion applies only to damages (or to a settlement
of a claim for damages) received on account of a personal injury or sickness.
It has no application to an individual's voluntary sale of a body part or
personal right. Federal law prohibits the sale of human organs.67 But, if such
a sale were permitted or were made in violation of the law (if, for example,
a kidney were sold to a person needing a transplant), the entire amount
received by the seller would be taxed as gain. It would not matter that the
amount realized merely replaced a part of the seller's human capital or that
the organ's basis is unascertainable. The prohibition against the sale of a
human organ does not apply to the sale of blood, and it is well established
that an amount realized by an individual on a sale of blood is ordinary
67. National Organ Transplant Act, § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1988).
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income.68 Although damages for an invasion of privacy (e.g., the use of the
taxpayer's picture for a commercial or advertising program) are likely
excluded from income by section 104(a)(2), an amount received in a volun-
tary sale of the right to use the taxpayer's picture in a commercial program
is taxable.
It is clear then that not all payments that substitute a monetary
payment for a personal right or human capital are excluded from income.
Thus, neither the fact of such a substitution nor the unascertainable basis of
such items is sufficient by itself to justify an exclusion from income.
However, the human capital consideration might be combined with other
factors to justify the exclusion provided by section 104(a)(2). The author later
considers that possibility.
The human capital theory might derive from the tax treatment of
damages reimbursing expenditures made by the taxpayer. To the extent a
damage recovery is attributable to dollars spent by the taxpayer and therefore
is merely substitution for those dollars, it should not be taxable, whether or
not section 104(a)(2) applies, unless a deduction was allowed for the
expenditures. For example, a reimbursement for an injured person's medical
expenses is excluded from income unless a deduction was allowed for the
expenditures.69 Similarly, if a taxpayer's property was destroyed by wrong-
ful act, damages received for the loss of the property are taxable only to the
extent that they exceed the taxpayer's basis for the property. Such treatment
is no different than the tax treatment that would have applied if the taxpayer
had sold the property before it was destroyed. Another illustration of this
principle arose in a 1939 Board of Tax Appeals case, Clark v. Commission-
er,7° involving a taxpayer who had overpaid a federal tax liability because
of poor advice received from his attorney. The court held that the attorney's
reimbursement of the amount overpaid was not included in the taxpayer's
income.
It is possible that the principle of allowing tax-free reimbursement of
lost dollars was extended by those who conceived the human capital theory
68. In Green v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1229 (1980), the Tax Court held that
payments received for the sale of blood are gross income. The taxpayer in Green did not
dispute the taxability of such receipts, but claimed that she should be allowed deductions for
expenses related to the sale. Nevertheless, the court passed on the issue of taxability. In Lary
v. United States, 787 F.2d 1538 (1 1th Cir. 1986), the court denied a charitable deduction for
a blood donation because, if the taxpayer had sold his blood, he would have recognized
ordinary income equal to the amount received. No charitable deduction is allowed for the
amount of a contribution that would have been ordinary income if the item had instead been
sold by the donor for its fair market value. IRC § 170(e)(1)(A).
69. IRC § 104(a); Regs. § 1.104-1(a). A recovery of a previously deducted amount
is taxed because the injured-person would otherwise be left with a double tax benefit.
70. 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), acq., 1957-1 C.B. 4.
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to cover amounts received in substitution for a loss of personal rights or
human capital. That extension has some superficial appeal, but as noted
above, it does not withstand scrutiny. The tax treatment of the voluntary sale
of such personal rights indicates that the return of human capital rationale is
inadequate by itself to explain section 104(a)(2).
C. hIvoluntary Conversion
Another rationale suggested for section 104(a)(2) is that since the
taxpayer did not choose to dispose of the damaged personal right or body
part, it seems rapacious to tax damages received as compensation for such a
personal loss. Relief is provided when damages are received to compensate
for a destruction of tangible property. Gain is realized to the extent that the
damages exceed the taxpayer's basis in the property. The involuntariness of
the conversion of the item into cash arouses sympathy because of the forced
realization of previously unrealized gain accrued to the property. Section
1033 provides relief for a taxpayer in that predicament: If, within a specified
period of time, the taxpayer acquires property similar or related in service or
use to the destroyed property, the gain realized on the conversion is taxed
only to the extent the conversion proceeds exceed the cost of the replacement
property. The taxpayer's investment in the destroyed item is rolled over and
becomes part of the taxpayer's basis in the replacement property. In effect,
the taxpayer's realized gain is deferred, at least in part, until the taxpayer
disposes of the replacement property (or until the taxpayer is allowed
depreciation deductions for that property if it is depreciable).
The question then is whether, in the case of a personal injury
recovery, the involuntariness of the conversion of the taxpayer's personal
rights or body parts is a sufficient justification for not taxing the damages
received. In most such cases, the taxpayer has no means of reinvesting the
proceeds in something similar or related in service or use to the destroyed
item. If such a replacement can be located, the replacement is usually only
partial, and its cost is often substantially less than the amount of damages
suffered by the taxpayer, making a section 1033 deferral concept of little
value. For example, a lost arm can be replaced with an artificial limb, but an
artificial limb replaces only part of the function of the lost arm, and its cost
is likely far less than the damages recoverable for the injury. Much of what
the taxpayer lost cannot be replaced by anything similar in use.
Since a deferral of gain is not readily available, should the taxpayer
be taxed on the entire amount of the gain at the time of receipt or should
some relief be accorded? The taxation of damages received in a lump sum in
one year may cause a bunching of income that subjects the taxpayer to a
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large tax because of the operation of the graduated rates,7' and one might
at least expect some relief from the bunching effect, perhaps by a form of
income-averaging. Section 104(a)(2) instead excludes all such damages from
income permanently, an approach not well crafted to provide relief from the
bunching effect. Involuntariness alone is not a sufficient justification for this
extraordinary exclusionary treatment since the involuntary conversion of
tangible property is not treated so gently.
D. Combination of Considerations.
Given the sympathy that a personal injury engenders, the section
104(a)(2) exclusion is perhaps warranted by the combination of the fact that
a personal right or body part was destroyed (the return of human capital
theory) and the involuntariness of the conversion. That is, even though neither
factor alone is sufficient, the cumulative effect of the combination of the
factors may be sufficient. The whole may well be greater than the sum of its
parts.
The author believes that there are two additional factors that color the
combination of the human capital theory and the involuntariness of the con-
version of a body part, and the addition of that coloration makes a compelling
case for the exclusion of such damages when given for a physical injury.
1. Noncommercial Zone.-The tax law is aimed at market transac-
tions. Gain on a sale of an item held for personal use, such as a residence or
a piece of jewelry, is taxed, but, in such cases, the taxpayer has chosen to
place the item into the commercial market by putting it up for sale. More-
over, those types of property are commonly bought and sold in the market
place and are properly regarded as commercial items. In contrast, noncom-
mercial personal attributes are not traded in the market and lie far outside the
zone of properties and activities that comprise the sphere of the tax laws'
operation.
For example, if two persons exchange their services, each must
typically include in income an amount equal to the value of the services
received from the other.72 However, when a husband and wife exchange
71. Bunching can arise from the recognition in one year of appreciation in the value
of the destroyed right that has taken place over many prior years. It can also arise from the
receipt of a lump sum payment for a loss of income that would have been earned over several
future years if the injury had not occurred. Later in this Part, the author questions whether
damages for a physical injury truly are a substitute for lost monetary value. On the other hand,
a proposal to tax such damages rests in part on the premise that the damages are a substitute.
If so, that raises a bunching problem that needs to be addressed.
72. Regs. § 1.61-2(d)(1).
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their services by splitting household chores between them, neither recognizes
income.73 Similarly, if several persons living in Manhattan, each of whom
owns a small piece of land on Long Island on which vegetables are grown,
agree to take turns travelling to Long Island and watering the gardens owned
by all of them, they are exchanging services, but they should not be taxed on
that exchange because it occurs outside the market. Another example of
activities within a noncommercial zone is a baby-sitting club in which parents
sit for each other's children under a kind of barter arrangement. On the other
hand, bartered exchanges can become so structured and substantial that they
represent more than joint activities, in which case the parties have moved into
the commercial sphere and their bartered exchange should be taxable.
When a part of an individual's body is damaged or destroyed, what
has been taken from the individual is predominantly of a noncommercial
nature. Since humans are engaged in commercial activities, their bodies and
personal attributes are inexorably entwined with those activities. However, an
individual's body and personal attributes are merely used in commercial
activities; they are not detached and sold in the market place. It is a rare
person who would contemplate the sale of body parts to be removed from
him while still alive. If such a transaction were to take place, the individual
would have committed the sale of that body part to a commercial venture;
there is no reason for the tax law to exempt from taxation the gain from such
a sale, and it does not do so. However, if a body part is destroyed or injured,
the compensation that the victim receives is not the product of having volun-
tarily committed that part to a commercial sale. Although the victim must
actively seek reparations in order to be compensated, that is the consequence
of the injury and is not a voluntary entrance into the commercial market.
2. Vulturous Behavior.--Perhaps, the most important consideration
that weighs against taxing such damages is the heartlessness of the govern-
ment profiting from the tort law's attempt to soften the blow that a victim has
suffered. Monetary damages are not true truly substitutes for a victim's loss,
but, at most, some mitigation of it. Much of the loss is not monetary, but
only monetary damages can be given because no substitute is available to
replace what was lost. If the government were to tax damages for the loss of
a body part (or for the death of a relative), it would seem to many to have
engaged in a vulturous act-analogous to feeding off of the flesh of a
dismembered arm or leg or off of the corpse of a recently departed.
73. No statute or regulation expressly exempts a spousal exchange of services from
taxation. Under § 1041, which was added in 1984. no gain or loss is recognized on an
interspousal transfer of property, but the provision does not address the tax consequences of
exchanging services. The Service has never sought to tax interspousal exchanges of services.
and the exclusion of such exchanges is part of the unwritten law of taxation.
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The compassionate motivation for the exclusion has much greater
force when the damages compensate for physical injury than when the injury
is not physical. Even physical injuries are not always severe, and a minor
injury (such as a sprained ankle) does not create so much sympathy that it
makes the taxation of damages received for the injury unpalatable.
74
However, there are several reasons why the existence of minor physical
injuries detracts little from the validity of the theory that the repression of
vulturous behavior is a major justification for the exclusion. While the author
has no empirical data, his intuition is that most of the dollars obtained as
damages and settlements for physical injuries involve serious harm. The costs
of obtaining damages for minor injuries discourage victims from prosecuting
their claims, and those who do pursue them obtain only small amounts. Since
damages for a minor injury are usually small, it is not worth the administra-
tive hassle to establish and enforce criteria to distinguish between major and
minor physical injuries. Consequently, the sympathy aroused for major
physical injuries spills over to provide relief for the less worthy sufferers of
minor injuries. It is not uncommon that the compelling concerns that cause
the adoption of a relief provision also benefit a limited number of persons
who are fortunate enough to fall within the scope of the remedial provision,
even though their plight is not the one that triggered its adoption. Taxation
is a practical enterprise, and it is not always practical to restrict a provision's
application to those on whose behalf it was passed.
The compassionate justification and the human capital justification
apply more readily to damages for noneconomic injuries than to damages for
lost income. The justification for excluding damages for lost income is
discussed below in Part Ill.E.
The compassionate justification rests (at least in part) on the notion
that damages for noneconomic injuries are compensatory in nature. However,
many commentators view the function of such damages quite differently, and
some believe that damages for noneconomic losses, such as pain and
suffering, mental anguish, and humiliation, should not be allowed in negli-
gence cases.75
There are numerous theories as to why tort law typically allows
noneconomic damages. One possibility is that, while the victim has suffered
a real loss for which compensation should be provided, monetary damages
are the only available means of compensation. If no damages were given for
noneconomic injuries, the victim might feel that the loss is lightly regarded.
74. See J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related
Personal Injury Awards: The Need for Limits, 50 Mont. L. Rev. 13, 43-44 (1989) (making that
observation).
75. See, e.g., Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 344-47 (Cal.
1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting) and the articles cited therein.
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The monetary compensation for such losses assures the victim's personal
integrity and is testimony that society regards the violation of that integrity
as a serious matter. Monetary damages for noneconomic loss can be viewed
as an effort to assuage the victim's anger at the injury and to reestablish the
victim's self-confidence in his personal integrity. 76 If such damages serve
only these symbolic purposes, taxation of the damages would not have a
rapacious or vulturous appearance because the requirement that the tortfeasor
pay is sufficient to secure those purposes.
Another view describes damages for noneconomic injuries as a
punitive measure designed to deter negligent acts. The damages raise the
price of negligence in order to make it economically prudent for businesses
to expend the amounts needed to provide greater safety. If that view is
correct, there is no justification for not taxing the damages.
However, it is far from certain that either of the two views described
immediately above is correct. The victim has suffered a genuine loss, and
while monetary damages are not a substitute for what was lost, they can be
seen as an attempt to compensate for that loss by the only means available.
Compensation is an effort to balance the scales so as to put the victim as near
to the same condition that he had before the injury as is feasible. That it is
not possible to substitute the same item that was lost, and that the personal
loss from a serious injury to a body part cannot be measured in monetary
terms, does not mean that the monetary damages given to the victim do not
serve a compensatory purpose.
Each of the several theories as to why damages are provided for
noneconomic losses is plausible. A dispositive case cannot be made that one
of those explanations is better than another. Congress apparently adopted the
explanation that the damages for noneconomic losses are designed to mitigate
the victim's loss. Since that explanation is at least as good as any other, there
is no basis to challenge the choice that Congress made.
In any event, whatever some commentators may believe, the com-
monly held view of such damages (including the view generally held by
American courts) is that they are compensatory and are intended to provide
relief for the victim's injury. Even if that view does not withstand an
economic analysis (and even if such an analysis is considered dispositive of
the issue), the prevalence of that view would make the government appear
rapacious if it were to tax noneconomic damages. Our self-assessment system
76. See Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18
Law & Contemp. Probs. 219 (1953). While recognizing the consolatory role of noneconomic
damages, Professor White has opined that American courts conceive of such recoveries "'as
essentially compensatory rather than as consolatory," at least where the victim suffered
physical injury. Patricia D. White, Pain and Suffering and the Law, 2 Biolaw S:113, S:117
(1988).
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of taxation relies on a willingness of the populace to report honestly to the
government, and that willingness rests on a popular belief that the govern-
ment's system of taxation is fair. The government should therefore take into
account not only whether the taxation of such damages would be vulturous,
but also whether it would appear to the general population to be so. While
the appearance of fairness is not always a strong enough consideration to
control the tax treatment of an item, it should be taken into account,
especially in a case such as this where the view that such damages have a
noncompensatory nature rests on an opinion that is not widely shared.
3. Author's Conclusions.-In the author's view, the noncommercial
and nonmonetary nature of a destroyed or injured body part and the vulturous
portrait that would be painted by the government's profiting from a personal
tragedy explain why a suggestion that the damages for such an injury be
taxed is typically met with a vigorous renunciation." A body part is not
perceived to be a commercial item, the taxpayer never sought to commercial-
ize its value by selling it, and the damages mitigate the loss of a personal
attribute the value of which never would have been taxed if the injury had
not occurred. The damages received for the loss of a body part are widely
viewed as mitigation of the victim's loss. A diversion of a portion of those
damages to the government would impair that mitigation. While a strict
application of such tax concepts as basis and the measurement of gain lead
to the taxation of such receipts, the countervailing considerations are very
strong. As with many tax provisions, the appropriateness of retaining them
depends upon value judgments.
E. Income-Connected Damages
Personal injury damages compensating for the loss of income (back-
pay and compensation for the loss of potential future income) are also
excluded from income by section 104(a)(2). 78 For convenience, the damages
compensating for income loss are sometimes referred to here as "income-
connected damages." Such damages might be viewed as a substitute for
77. The author has often raised this issue with students in his basic income tax
course. Many students find it difficult even to consider seriously a proposal to tax damages
for physical injuries. Some years ago, when the author was teaching as a visitor at Stanford
Law School, a student expressed hostility to even examining this issue and made a thinly
veiled suggestion that the author's raising the issue for discussion placed his sanity in question.
78. Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50. "Backpay" has been described as "the
differential between the appropriate pay and actual pay for services performed." Horton v.
Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 96 n.6 (1993) (reviewed by the court), aff'd, 33 F.3d 625 (6th
Cir. 1994) (2-1 decision).
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income items that would have been taxable when received. Why should
damages obtained in lieu of taxable income escape taxation?
1. Given in Mitigation of Personal Loss Rather Than in Substitution
for Lost Income.-As previously noted, damages for physical injury do not
substitute for the noneconomic aspects of that loss because there is no
monetary substitute for such injuries as the loss of a limb or eyesight or of
the use of a limb. Damages for pain and suffering or for a reduction of the
quality of the victim's life style, or amounts received as general damages, do
not replace what the victim lost. The income lost because of an injury is more
readily measurable than is this personal loss, but even that measurement
involves considerable speculation, especially as to income that would have
been earned in the future.
The exemption of income-connected damages can be justified on the
ground that such damages should not be separated from general damages
because the total damages merely mitigate the victim's personal loss and do
not fully compensate for it. The nature of the compensation package is not
changed by the fact that the courts utilize an estimate of income lost as part
of the effort to arrive at a just amount of compensation. When a victim
suffers a physical injury, the loss cannot be measured in dollars, and the
courts can do no more than resort to some conventional devices to arrive at
a reasonable amount of mitigation. One of the devices utilized for that
purpose is to estimate lost income. The measurement of lost income lends
respectability to the enterprise by suggesting greater precision than actually
exists. Also, income loss is one of the few aspects of the victim's loss
(medical expenses being another) that relate to money. Since money is all that
can be granted to the victim, it is understandable that tort law seizes on a
money loss as a measure of part of what must be paid to the victim. But, that
should not obscure what damage awards are all about.
2. Administrative Convenience.-Another (and perhaps the principal)
reason for not taxing income-related damages is administrative convenience.
In weighing this consideration, assume (contrary to the discussion above) that
income-connected damages are a substitute for lost income. In fact, they are
generally so regarded.
Frequently, personal injury damages, whether received pursuant to a
settlement or to a jury's award, consist of a single undifferentiated amount
that is not subdivided among the victim's several losses. Whether payment
is received in a lump sum or as periodic payments, the portions compensating
for lost income (both past and future) typically are not identified.
If the income-connected amount of compensatory damages were to
be treated differently for tax purposes than the portions attributable to other
losses (e.g., pain and suffering), it would be necessary to separate an award
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or settlement between its income-connected and nonincome-connected
portions, and the taxpayer would likely have the burden of proof on that
issue. The result would be a significant administrative burden on taxpayers
and the Service.79 While the burden would not be insurmountable, it would
be substantial in most cases. In a typical case, it might not be especially
difficult to ascertain the portion of undifferentiated damages attributable to
back wages or other predictable income that would have been earned by the
victim if the injury had not occurred. However, compensation for the victim's
diminished future earning capacity is highly speculative and virtually
impossible to determine with any confidence.
Moreover, the lost income for which damages are obtained would
typically have been earned over a period of many years. If income-connected
damages were taxed and if the damages were received during a single taxable
year, income for many years would be bunched into one taxable year, often
causing the tax rate to be much higher than would have been the case if the
income had been earned over many years. 80 Some form of tax relief would
be necessary to prevent over-taxation of the damages. An income-averaging
device could provide adequate relief for the bunching of past income," but
79. In Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 1983), the court stated:
An individual who wins a personal injury suit [is] usually given a lump-
sum award that includes an amount for items that ordinarily would be
taxable, such as lost income.... [T]he Commissioner has long excluded
from income the entire monetary judgment .... The rationale behind the
exclusion of the entire award is apparently a feeling that the injured party,
who has suffered enough, should not be further burdened with the practical
difficulty of sorting out the taxable and nontaxable components of a lump-
sum award.
80. The bunching problem is mentioned above in Part III.A in the discussion of
whether the Congressional purpose for adopting § 104(a)(2) was to constrain the size of tort
damages for personal injuries. The author concluded that Congress had no such purpose and
that an exclusionary provision cannot affect the size of tort damages unless state laws are
modified as a consequence thereof, and the states generally have not done so.
The bunching problem discussed here is a different issue-whether bunching would
be a hardship for the victim and, if so, whether an income-averaging device could adequately
mitigate that hardship.
81. Income-averaging can be accomplished by treating the income-connected
damages as if they were earned ratably over a period of years and by treating the marginal
income tax rates applicable to the income in each such year as being the same as would be
imposed on the portion of the income that is deemed to be earned in the current year. Assume
individual T receives $100,000 in Year 1 as income-connected damages, and such damages
have been made taxable by Congress, subject to an income-averaging device that treats
income-connected damages as having been earned ratably over a ten-year period beginning
with the year of receipt. The tax on T would be determined by (1) adding one tenth of the
$100,000 ($10,000) to T's other income for Year 1, (2) determining the tax on the resulting
amount, (3) computing the tax on 7's taxable income exclusive of the damage income, and (4)
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that device probably would not deal adequately with damages for the loss of
the capacity to earn income in the future. The estimate of a victim's lost
future income could encompass a large number of years, and income-
averaging over a fixed number of years would be insufficient if the fixed
number were less than the number of years for which damages were received.
If income-averaging were to be based on the actual number of years for
which income-connected damages were obtained, that would require a
determination of the number of such years, and the difficulty in making that
determination would exacerbate the administrative difficulties of determining
the amount of income-connected damages.
It is therefore likely that administrative feasibility plays a significant
(and perhaps exclusive) role in the decision not to tax income-connected
damages. Arguably, the judgment that administrative feasibility is important
enough to justify the exclusion of such damages from income gives too much
weight to that consideration and perhaps overestimates the degree of inconve-
nience that would result from taxing income-connected damages. But, it is not
unreasonable to adjust the tax laws to accommodate administrative difficul-
ties, and many tax provisions owe their existence to that purpose. The
exclusion of income-connected damages is buttressed by the suggestion made
earlier that these damages are not substitutes for lost income, but rather are
part of an imprecise measurement of the amount of mitigation that is fair.
Since the goal of administrative feasibility is a rational basis for excluding
income-connected damages from taxation, there is no inconsistency between
that exclusion and the rationale for excluding compensatory damages in
general. Rather, the exclusion of income-connected damages rests on a
separate, independent base, which must be judged on its own merits.
In some cases, the damages for lost income are identified. When
identified, should they be taxed? There is no administrative burden in such
cases, but if those amounts were taxed when identified but not taxed when
part of an undifferentiated sum, recipients of personal injury awards would
be taxed differently depending upon the happenstance of whether the lost
income item is identified. Especially in settlements, the tax on separately
identified amounts could easily be avoided and would operate principally as
a trap for the unwary. The extension of the exclusion to such cases likely
stems from an unwillingness to tax differently two sets of victims who
received identical damages but with different labels. Perhaps, another reason
subtracting the latter amount from the tax computed in (2). Amount (4) is the tax on one tenth
of the income-connected damages at T's marginal tax bracket. The tax on the S100,000 of
income-connected damages is therefore 10 times amount (4). See IRC § 402(d) (allowing such
an averaging device to be used for lump sum distributions from qualified pension and profit
sharing plans).
19951
HeinOnline  -- 2 Fla. Tax Rev. 355 1994-1995
Florida Tax Review
not to tax those amounts is the suggestion made above that income-connected
damages are not actually substitutes for lost income.
F. Injuries to Nonphysical Personal Rights
It has been established for at least 22 years that section 104(a)(2) also
applies to damages for injury to nonphysical personal fights (sometimes
referred to as "dignitary" torts).82 Nevertheless, the recent expansion of the
reach of that exclusionary measure to damages for injuries to rights that, at
best, are only marginally personal makes it appropriate to ask whether the
policy considerations supporting the exclusion of damages for physical injury
apply as well when the injury is exclusively nonphysical.
As previously discussed, the policy underpinning of section 104(a)(2)
apparently consists of a combination of several factors: (1) the victim's
damaged or destroyed human capital is a noncommercial item that the victim
never intended to market; (2) the victim was forced into a commercial
transaction because money is the only available recompense; (3) the personal
nature of the damaged item makes it impossible for the victim to invest the
damages in similar property in order to qualify for a rollover of the gain; and
(4) the plight of a victim who suffers the loss of a body part through
another's tortious act elicits sympathy that makes it repugnant to tax the
victim because there would be something vulturous in having the government
require the victim to share with it a portion of the recompense received for
the loss of part of the victim's person.
The exclusion has been extended to damages for loss of reputation,
emotional and mental harm, humiliation, and other injuries. Examples of
actions that cause those nonphysical injuries are defamatory statements,
discriminatory treatment, harassment, invasion of privacy, wrongful discharge
from employment, malicious prosecution, misrepresentation in a commercial
venture, and possibly even failure by an airline to honor a reservation.83 To
what extent do the policy considerations listed above support tax-exemption
for damages for injury exclusively to a nonphysical personal right?
1. The nonphysical attributes listed above are noncommercial in
the sense that while they may be utilized in commercial
activities, individuals do not voluntarily separate them from
82. See Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32 (1972), acq., 1972-2 C.B. 3.
83. In Hill v. United States, 733 F. Supp. 88 (D. Kan. 1990), the court held that a
settlement of a misrepresentation claim against United Airlines was excluded from income by
§ 104(a)(2). While the court's opinion does not explain the nature of the misrepresentation,
the author was informed by an attorney at the Department of Justice that the taxpayer's claim
arose from being bumped from a flight.
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their personae and sell them on the market. For example, an
individual can exploit his reputation, but he cannot detach it
from himself and dispose of it. However, claims arising
exclusively from nonphysical injuries (e.g., actions for
wrongful discharge or for discrimination in employment)
often relate to improper interference with commercial activi-
ties. Many claims for nonphysical injuries are more closely
identified with commercial ventures than is the case for torts
involving physical injury. There is thus less justification to
treat damages for nonphysical injuries as lying beyond the
commercial sphere of the income tax system.
2. The involuntariness of the conversion of portions of the
victim's persona into money damages is equally present
whether the injury is physical or nonphysical.
3. As with physical injuries, the victim of a nonphysical injury
cannot invest the damages in property that is similar or
related in service or use.
4. In general, the plight of a victim who has suffered only
nonphysical injuries does not arouse anything like the sympa-
thy that is engendered by a physical injury.' An extreme
case in which the victim suffered great mental and emotional
harm can arouse substantial sympathy. But, even such a case
does not attract the degree of compassion that is felt for a
victim of serious physical injury such as the loss of a limb
or a facial disfigurement. Moreover, unlike the case of
physical injuries, losses associated with nonphysical injuries
are principally pecuniary, although, concededly, the alloca-
tion of damages awarded in such cases does not always
reflect that dominance.
The policy justification for excluding damages is thus weaker when
the injury is exclusively nonphysical than when physical injury is involved.
A division along a physical-nonphysical boundary is not a perfect basis for
delimiting the exclusion. Ideally, damages for some types of physical injuries
should be taxed, and damages for some types of nonphysical injuries should
be excluded from income. In a fantastic world in which there are no transac-
tional costs, a more valid boundary might be one that divided injuries
associated primarily with commercial activities from those that have their
primary association with noncommercial activities. However, the administra-
84. See Burke & Friel, supra note 74. at 43-44. The authors suggest. however, that
the victims of discrimination might be worthy subjects of humanitarian tax relief.
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tive difficulties of applying that standard are daunting. While a distinction
along physical-nonphysical lines would not be perfect, it would be easy to
administer and would generally be valid. A physical-nonphysical division
would be a surrogate for a commercial-noncommercial distinction, and any
imprecision in the reach of the exclusion would be relatively minor and
justified by the administrative convenience of having a bright-line standard.
Even if Congress were to limit the statutory exclusion to cases
involving physical injury, the exclusion should continue to cover damages for
nonphysical losses that are byproducts of a physical injury. For example,
damages for the emotional harm suffered because of the loss of a limb should
be excluded. Where the victim of a physical injury also incurs nonphysical
injuries from the same wrongful act, there are good reasons not to segregate
the damages for nonphysical injuries and tax them. The reasons given in Part
III.E for not segregating income-connected damages from damages for
noneconomic injuries apply equally when damages cover both nonphysical
and physical injuries. Also, a nonphysical injury that arises as a byproduct of
a physical injury is likely to have a noncommercial nature, making the
recovery of human capital theory applicable in those cases.
G. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are awarded primarily to punish the tortfeasor and
thereby deter willfully or wantonly wrongful behavior.8 ' The existence and
size of punitive awards depends upon the degree of the wrongdoer's culpabil-
ity. While the extent of the injury is taken into account, it is used only as one
means of measuring the degree of wrongdoer's culpability. Even the severity
of criminal sanctions, which are clearly punitive measures, is influenced by
the extent of the harm done. For example, the punishment for a drunken
85. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 (1977) reads as follows:
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal
damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous
conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous,
because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the
rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can
properly consider the character of the defendant's act, the nature and
extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to
cause and the wealth of the defendant.
See also Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 (West Supp. 1995); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1 (1991); Marc A. Franklin & Robert L. Rabin, Cases and Materials on Tort Law and
Alternatives 622 (4th ed. 1987).
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driver who injures a pedestrian is usually more severe if the victim dies than
if he lives. The resort to the harm done by the wrongdoer as one of the
factors for measuring the amount of punitive damages therefore does not
detract from the punitive nature of such damages.8 Punitive damages are
paid to the injured party, rather than to the state, to encourage the victim to
act as a kind of private attorney general in enforcing policies of the state,s'
and, it has been suggested, because punitive damages can have a compensa-
tory element."s
As discussed previously, compensatory damages can also serve a
punitive purpose (at least as to damages for noneconomic injuries), but the
dominant purpose for compensatory damages is to mitigate the harm that the
victim incurred. Conversely, while the dominant purpose of punitive damages
is to punish the wrongdoer, the suggestion has been made that the manner in
which the victim was injured can cause additional harm that may be difficult
or even impossible to identify.89 On that theory, one of the roles of punitive
damages is to compensate the victim for harm whose existence the victim is
unable to demonstrate. However, even if punitive damages do play such a
compensatory role, it is a minor feature that pales to insignificance when
compared to their principal role-to punish.90
Given the predominantly punitive nature of punitive damages, there
is no policy justification for excluding them from income. They do not
qualify for the return-of-human-capital justification since they are given to
punish and deter, not to mitigate a loss of human capital. They do not
represent a conversion of a noncommercial item into cash. Because they do
not replace anything, the unavailability of a suitable substitute for reinvest-
ment is not a factor. Finally, since the award is made to the victim (rather
than to a government) in order to provide an incentive to bring the suit, the
taxation of that award is not rapacious and does not put the government in
86. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. e (1977) states in part:
In determining the amount of punitive damages, as well as in deciding
whether they should be given at all, the trier of fact can properly consider
not merely the act itself but all the circumstances .... In addition, the
extent of harm to the injured person can be considered by analogy to the
doctrine of the criminal law by which the seriousness of a crime may
depend upon the harm done ....
87. See Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled
Approach, 31 Hastings LJ. 639, 649-50 (1980).
88. E.g., Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 1994) (2-1 decision)
(quoting with approval from a Kentucky Supreme Court decision).
89. Id. at 632. The likelihood that punitive damages serve such a compensatory
purpose was greatly reduced, and possibly eliminated, long ago when the law began to allow
damage awards for noneconomic injuries.
90. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 (1977), quoted above in note 85.
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an unflattering light. Punitive damages are a windfall that increases the
recipient's wealth.91 All accretions to wealth should be taxed unless there
is a compelling policy reason not to do so, and no such reason exists as to
punitive damages.
IV. BURKE DECISION AND SUBSEQUENT CASES
Immediately before the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in United
States v. Burke,92 the status of the decisional law under section 104(a)(2)
was as follows:
1. The exclusion applied to damages for nonphysical personal
injuries as well as to those for physical injuries.93
2. The exclusion applied to damages for defamation of an
individual whether the defamed reputation was professional
or personal.94
3. There was a division of authority as to whether damages
received by victims of employment discrimination were
excludable.95
4. The prevailing view was that the focus of the inquiry in a
section 104(a)(2) case should be on the nature of the tax-
payer's claim, rather than on the character of the damages.96
5. To qualify for the exclusion, the taxpayer's claim had to be
in tort or be tort-type.97
91. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
92. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
93. Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987); Seay v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 32 (1972), acq., 1972-2 C.B. 3.
94. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); Threlkeld v. Commis-
sioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986) (reviewed by the court), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
95. Compare Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North America, 940 F.2d 542 (9th Cir.
1991) (excluding such damages), Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990)
(same) and Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989) (same) with Sparrow v.
Commissioner, 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3009 (1992) (taxing
such damages) and Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) (taxing damages
received as backpay under the Equal Pay Act because they were not given for a tort-type right,
but excluding liquidated damages because they were given for a tort-type right).
96. E.g., Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); Threlkeld v.
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986) (reviewed by the court), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1988).
97. Regs. § 1.104-1(c); Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North America, 940 F.2d 542
(9th Cir. 1991); Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
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6. The Tax Court had applied the exclusion to punitive damag-
es, but the Fourth Circuit had reversed, including punitive
damages in income."8
The taxpayers in Burke had obtained a settlement on their damage
claim for sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
At the time of the settlement, the only remedies provided by Title VII were
backpay and equitable relief (e.g., reinstatement). 99 The taxpayers paid a
federal income tax on their settlement but sought a refund on the ground that
the amounts received were excluded from income by section 104(a)(2). After
losing in the district court, they prevailed on appeal to the Sixth Circuit,
which decided the case by a divided vote. The Supreme Court reversed the
Sixth Circuit's decision, holding that the settlement amounts were taxable.
The Court adopted the regulations' definition of the term "damages
received" in section 104(a)(2): an "amount received... through prosecution
of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort-type rights or through a
settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution."'" Accord-
ingly, the Court concluded that, to qualify for the statutory exclusion,
damages must be based on a tort or tort-type claim. The Court looked to
common law tort concepts in defining the words "tort or tort-type rights." It
noted that damages are an "essential characteristic of every true tort" and held
that the availability of damages was a sine qua non of a claim's qualifying
as a tort. However, not just any old damage award would do. The Court said
that the "hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad
range of damages to compensate the plaintiff 'fairly for injuries caused by the
violation of his legal rights."''" The range of damages that may be award-
ed to a tort victim includes more than an allowance for the victim's pecuniary
losses (e.g., for lost wages, medical expenses, and diminished future earning
capacity). Damages also are permitted for noneconomic losses such as
emotional stress and pain and suffering. The victim of a dignitary or non-
physical tort can receive (in addition to reimbursement for pecuniary losses)
damages for impairment of reputation and standing in the community,
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Moreover, the Court said,
98. Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330 (1989) (reviewed by the court), rev'd sub
nom. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
99. In footnote 9 of the Burke opinion, the Supreme Court noted that some courts
had allowed Title VII plaintiffs who were wrongfully discharged to recover damages for -front
pay" (projected lost future earnings) when reinstatement was not feasible. 112 S. Ct. at 1873.
100. Regs. § 1.104-1(c).
101. Burke, 112 S. C. at 1871 (quoting from Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247. 257
(1978)).
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"punitive or exemplary damages are generally available in those instances
where the defendant's misconduct was intentional or reckless."'
' 2
The Court did not identify particular types of damages that must be
available to qualify a claim as tort-like. However, Title VII, as it existed
when the taxpayers in Burke obtained their settlements, permitted only back-
pay damages. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the taxpayer's claims
were not tort or tort-type claims, and their settlements were taxable. 3
The majority in Burke decided that section 104(a)(2) is not limited
to damages for physical injuries. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
contended that the exclusion should not apply if there is no physical injury,
but the majority rejected this contention. The majority opinion's response to
Justice Scalia includes a long footnote (footnote 6), one small part of which
suggests that the view that section 104(a)(2) applies to nonphysical injuries
is supported by a 1989 amendment stating that section 104(a)(2) "shall not
apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving
physical injury or physical sickness." That part of the footnote has affected
the view of some judges as to the excludability of punitive damages. The
1989 amendment and the Supreme Court's characterization of it is discussed
in Part V.A of this article. In Part V.B, the author discusses the excludability
of punitive damages.
As could be anticipated, the decision in Burke has had a profound
effect on subsequent litigation. No more vivid example of that effect can be
found than the two decisions of the federal district court of Kansas in
O'Gilvie 1104 and O'Gilvie 11105 In O'Gilvie I, the court, granting the
government's motion for summary judgment, held punitive damages in a
wrongful death action to be taxable because they serve no compensatory
purpose and therefore are not received "on account of personal injury," as
required by section 104(a)(2). O'Gilvie I was decided the same day that the
Supreme Court promulgated its Burke decision. O'Gilvie moved for reconsid-
eration in light of Burke. In O'Gilvie II, the court granted the motion and
changed its decision entirely. Relying on its reading of Burke, the court
determined that it had erred in its prior ruling by focusing on the nature of
the punitive damage award, rather than on the nature of the underlying claim.
102. Id. at 1872.
103. As noted in Part II.E, Title VII was amended in 1991 to provide a broad range
of damages for disparate treatment type violations of that act (intentional discrimination). The
amended version did not apply in Burke because the facts of the case arose before the effective
date of the amendment.
104. O'Gilvie v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,344, 70 A.F.T.R.2d
(P-H) 92-5069 (D. Kan. 1992).
105. O'Gilvie v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) T 50,567, 71 A.F.T.R.2d
(P-H) 93-547 (D. Kan. 1992).
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Since the underlying claim was tort-type, the court decided that "its previous
order is contrary to Burke and must be reversed."'6 Summary judgment
was granted for the taxpayer. At this writing, an appeal is pending in the
Tenth Circuit.
In Horton v. Commissioner,10 7 the Tax Court, with only three
judges dissenting, held that punitive damages in connection with a personal
injury claim in tort are excluded from income by section 104(a)(2). The court
adhered to its pre-Burke decision to that effect in Miller, even though Miller
was reversed by the Fourth Circuit.'0 8 In Horton, the court placed great
reliance on the Supreme Court's opinion in Burke, construing Burke to hold
that once it is determined that the taxpayer's claim was based on tort or tort-
type rights, any damages obtained pursuant to the claim (including punitive
damages) are excluded from income. The court buttressed its reading of
Burke by noting that the Supreme Court mentioned punitive damages as one
of the remedies typically available for torts and that it was the unavailability
of a range of damages that led the Supreme Court to determine that the
damages at issue in Burke were taxable. In affirming the Tax Court's decision
in Horton, the Sixth Circuit (in a divided decision) also gave weight to Burke.
As previously noted, three Courts of Appeals have recently held that
punitive damages are taxable." 9 One of those cases, the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Hawkins v. United States, was a divided decision. In his dissent
in that case, Judge Trott gave great weight to the Burke decision.
The courts are also divided on whether the section 104(a)(2) exclu-
sion applies to damages obtained under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 (ADEA)."0 The ADEA permits equitable relief and the
award of only two types of damages: damages for pecuniary losses (backpay)
and liquidated damages of an equal amount."' Liquidated damages are only
allowed for willful violations.
Before Burke, the Tax Court (overruling several prior decisions of
that court) held in Downey I that both backpay and liquidated damages
received on an ADEA claim are excluded from income by section
104(a)(2).' 2 The taxpayer in Downey obtained a settlement on an ADEA
106. 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 50,567, 71 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 93-548.
107. 100 T.C. 93 (1993) (reviewed by the court), aff'd, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994)
(2-1 decision).
108. Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330 (1989) (reviewed by the court), rev'd sub
nora. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
109. Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir.) (2-1 decision), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 648 (1994); Reese v. Commissioner, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed Cir. 1994); Commissioner
v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
110. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
Ill. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b), 216(b).
112. Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150 (1991) (reviewed by the court).
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claim that allocated the settlement equally between backpay and liquidated
damages. Six judges in Downey I dissented as to the exclusion of the backpay
damages, but they agreed with the majority that the liquidated damages
should be excluded. After Burke was decided, the Service asked the Tax
Court to reconsider Downey I in light of Burke. After reconsideration, the Tax
Court promulgated a supplemental opinion (Downey II) in which it adhered
to its first decision, holding that Burke did not alter the majority's view."1 3
The court found that liquidated damages under ADEA compensate the victim
for nonpecuniary losses as well as serving a punitive purpose and that the
range of damages available under ADEA is thus sufficient to qualify a claim
thereunder as one for tort-type rights.
In Downey 111,114 the Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court,
finding that pre-Burke appellate decisions on the excludability of ADEA
damages rested on an analytical framework that is inconsistent with Burke.
The court therefore discarded those cases and focused on the Supreme
Court's treatment of the excludability issue. The Seventh Circuit concluded
that a claim is tort-type only if the available relief includes damages for
nonpecuniary losses, such as pain and suffering, emotional distress, and
personal humiliation. The ADEA only provides for pecuniary damages and,
in the case of a willful act, liquidated damages of an equal amount. The court
noted that there is a dispute as to whether liquidated damages under the
ADEA are punitive or compensatory. However, it concluded that even if
compensatory, the liquidated damages are designed to recompense the victim,
not for nonpecuniary injuries, but instead for the income loss resulting from
the unavailability of the pecuniary amounts until judgment or settlement of
the claim for damages. In other words, the liquidated damages are either
punitive or a substitute for prejudgment interest. In either event, in the court's
opinion, the range of damages under the ADEA is not sufficient to satisfy the
standard set by Burke, and all of the taxpayer's damages in Downey were
taxable.
The Ninth Circuit reached quite different conclusions in Schmitz v.
Commissioner."5 It found that the provision for liquidated damages in
ADEA cases has both compensatory and punitive purposes. The compensa-
tory purpose is to provide relief for damages that are too obscure and difficult
to prove. The court held that the restriction of liquidated damages to cases
where the employer acted willfully does not make those damages primarily
punitive in nature. It concluded that the range of remedies provided by the
113. Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634 (1993) (reviewed by the court).
114. Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed,
63 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1994) (No. 94-999).
115. 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S.
Nov. 23, 1994) (No. 94-944).
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ADEA satisfies the requirement established in Burke, and it held that the
damages received by Schmitz in settlement of his claim were excluded from
income." 6
In Schleier v. Comnnzissioner,17 the Fifth Circuit affirmed, without
written opinion, a Tax Court decision that ADEA damages are excluded from
income by section 104(a)(2). The Supreme Court has agreed to review that
decision.
Even when the violation is willful, liquidated damages may not be
granted in an ADEA case if the defendant is the federal government."'
Since federal employees can receive only backpay, the range of damages
available in their ADEA suits is too narrow for their claims to be tort-type,
and their damages are taxable. If the controversy concerning ADEA for non-
federal employees is resolved by excluding their damages from income, there
will be the anomalous result that the ADEA damages for federal employees
will be taxable while all other plaintiffs' ADEA damages will be excluded.
As a consequence of Burke, the Service now agrees that damages for
race-based discrimination under 42 U.S.C. section 1981, for disparate
treatment discrimination under Title VII, and for violations of the Americans
with Disabilities Act are excluded from income, but it continues to tax
damages for a disparate impact type violation of Title VII." 9
In McKay v. Conunissioner,12 the taxpayer, a former corporate
officer whose employment was terminated, sued the employer for wrongful
discharge, breach of employment contract, RICO violations, and punitive
damages. A jury awarded damages for lost compensation (both past and
future) and, because of the RICO violation, trebled the damages to more than
$43 million. The jury also awarded punitive damages. To avoid an appeal,
taxpayer settled with the employer for $16,744,300. In a settlement agreement
negotiated at arms' length, the parties agreed that more than $12 million of
the settlement was for the wrongful discharge claim, more than $2 million
116. The Ninth Circuit noted that several post-Burke decisions have held that Burke
did not change the prevailing pre-Burke conclusion that ADEA damages are excludable. The
one court of appeals case that the court cited is Purcell v. Sequin State Bank & Trust Co., 999
F.2d 950, 960-61 (5th Cir. 1993), which addressed the excludability issue in deciding whether
ADEA damages for backpay should be reduced to reflect an exemption from income taxes that
the victim would otherwise have incurred. Seemingly, the Fifth Circuit merely accepted
without independent examination the Tax Court's determination in Downey 1 that even after
Burke, such damages are excluded from income. However, in a subsequent case, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed a Tax Court decision holding that ADEA damages are excluded from income.
Schleier v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 507 (1994).
117. 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 507 (1994).
118. Smith v. Office of Personnel Management. 778 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1985).
119. Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61.
120. 102 T.C. 465 (1994).
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was for the breach of contract claim, and the balance was partial reimburse-
ment of various legal and litigation costs incurred in prosecuting the claims.
The agreement stated that no payment was made for punitive damages or for
RICO violations. The Tax Court accepted the settlement agreement's allo-
cation. Relying on Burke, the court held that the more than $12 million for
the wrongful discharge claim was excluded from income because wrongful
discharge is a tort claim.'2 ' An interesting and unresolved question is
whether the injury resulting from wrongful discharge can properly be classi-
fied as a "personal injury or sickness" to which section 104(a)(2) can apply.
V. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. 1989 Statutory Amendment
In 1989, Congress amended section 104(a) by adding at the end an
additional sentence stating that section 104(a)(2) "shall not apply to any
punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or
physical sickness."'22 Subject to transition rules, the added sentence applies
to amounts received after July 10, 1989. Thus, punitive damages received
after that effective date in cases involving discriminatory practices, defama-
tion, or other dignitary torts are taxable. The amendment will eliminate much
of the controversy concerning punitive damages, but several important issues
remain.
First, what is the tax treatment of punitive damages in a case in
which there has been a physical injury? In precluding the exclusion of
punitive damages when there is no physical injury, the language added in
1989 implies that punitive damages are excluded when there is a physical
injury. However, care should always be taken in making negative inferences.
As is shown below, an examination of the legislative history of the 1989
amendment establishes that Congress had no intention of passing on the
proper treatment of punitive damages in any circumstance other than where
there was no physical injury.
Second, does the adoption of the 1989 amendment demonstrate that
Congress believed that pre-1989 law excluded punitive damages from income
when received pursuant to a claim for a personal injury? Even if the amend-
ment does indicate that Congress held that belief, what weight should the
courts accord to it?
121. The taxpayer agreed that the balance of the settlement amount was taxable, but
contended that some of the litigation and legal expenses were deductible.
122. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641, 103
Stat. 2379.
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1. Post-1989 Punitive Damages in Cases Involving Phkysical
Injury.-While no case has yet arisen in which punitive damages for a
physical injury were received after July 10, 1989, several courts, including
the Supreme Court, have assumed that such damages are excluded by
negative inference from the 1989 amendment. For example, in footnote 6 of
the opinion in United States v. Burke, the Court stated:
Congress' 1989 amendment to section 104(a)(2) provides
further support for the notion that "personal injuries" in-
cludes physical as well as nonphysical injuries. Congress
rejected a bill that would have limited the section 104(a)(2)
exclusion to cases involving "physical injury or physical
sickness." See H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, pp. 1354-1355 (de-
scribing proposed section 11641 of H.R. 3299, 101st Cong.
1st Sess. (1989)... ). At the same time, Congress amended
section 104(a) to allow the exclusion of punitive damages
only in cases involving "physical injuty or physical sick-
ness."... The enactment of this limited amendment address-
ing only punitive damages shows that Congress assumed that
other damages (i.e., compensatory) would be excluded in
cases of both physical and nonphysical injury.'
In the italicized portion of the foregoing extract, the Supreme Court
construed the amendment as having both an inclusionary and an exclusionary
effect, allowing an exclusion for punitive damages in a case involving a
physical injury as well as denying an exclusion where the injury is not
physical. In fact, the amendment only addresses cases where there is no
physical injury and makes no express statement about the treatment of
damages when a physical injury is present. The Court did not analyze the
amendment; it simply assumed that the denial of an exclusion in nonphysical
cases amounted to allowing one in physical cases. The italicized comment is
in the middle of a lengthy footnote dealing with whether compensatory
damages for nonphysical injuries are excluded by section 104(a)(2). It is
dictum and does not appear to be the product of serious thought, much less
a consideration of the legislative history. Moreover, the comment is unneces-
sary to the Court's point in the footnote-that by precluding an exclusion for
punitive damages when the injury is nonphysical, Congress implied that
section 104(a)(2) applies to compensatory damages for nonphysical injuries.
There was no reason for the Court to focus on the applicability of the
amendment to physical injury claims, and it does not appear to have done so.
123. 112 S. CL 1867, 1871 n.6 (1992) (emphasis added).
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Nevertheless, some judges have taken the Supreme Court's statement
as support for the view that the 1989 amendment authorizes the exclusion of
punitive damages in cases involving physical injuries. For example, the
statement was cited with approval by the Sixth Circuit in its affirmance of the
Tax Court's decision that punitive damages are excluded from income by
section 104(a)(2).124 In addition, at least two commentators concluded that
the amendment impliedly permits the exclusion of punitive damages received
after 1989 in a case involving physical injuries.1
25
The legislative history of the 1989 amendment strongly suggests that
this inference is in error. The House Bill that ultimately became the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 contained a provision that would have
amended section 104(a)(2) to restrict the exclusion, for compensatory as well
as punitive damages, to cases involving physical injury or physical sick-
ness. 126 The bill, with that provision, was passed by the House on October
5, 1989. The Committee Report on the bill indicates that a principal purpose
of the amendment was to deny the exclusion to damages in employment
discrimination and defamation cases.'27
The Senate was not willing to make taxable all damages obtained for
nonphysical injuries and therefore refused to adopt the House's limitation. Its
bill made no mention of section 104 or of the treatment of damages. In a
Conference Committee compromise, the Senate agreed to bar the application
of section 104(a)(2) to punitive damages in a case involving only nonphysical
injuries. This limitation became law with the adoption of the conference
bill. 128
The Conference Committee reported the bill on November 21,
1989."29 Two months earlier, on September 13, 1989, the Tax Court
124. Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 1994) (2-1 decision). The
Supreme Court's statement was also quoted by Judge Trott in his dissenting opinion in
Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir.) (2-1 decision), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 648 (1994).
125. Arthur W. Andrews, The Taxation of Title VII Victims After the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 46 Tax Law. 755, 766 (1993); David A. Jaeger, Taxation of Punitive Damage
Awards: The Continuing Controversy, 57 Tax Notes 109, 114 (Oct. 5, 1992).
126. H.R. 3299, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 11641 (1989).
127. H.R. Rep. No. 247, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 1354-55 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2824-25.
128. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-239, § 7641, 103 Stat.
2379.
129. Revenue Provisions of Conference Agreement on H.R. 3299, Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989, released by Senate Finance Committee on November 21, 1989,
224 Daily Tax Report, Special Supplement (Nov. 22, 1989).
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promulgated its reviewed decision in Miller v. Commissioner,'30 in which
a majority of the court held that punitive damages can be excluded under
section 104(a)(2). The Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision on
September 21, 1990, ten months after the Conference compromise was
adopted by Congress. Consequently, when Congress acted, the principal case
on the excludability of punitive damages was a recent Tax Court decision, in
which only two judges dissented, holding that they are excluded.
The Conference Committee did not necessarily believe that punitive
damages would be excluded in the absence of the amendment. They could
well have intended no more than to assure that punitive damages will not be
excluded when there was no physical injury, regardless of how the courts
might otherwise resolve the question of the excludability of punitive damages.
Even if the Conference Committee believed that punitive damages would be
excludable without the amendment, that belief probably derived from the very
recent, reviewed Tax Court decision to that effect. The Committee could not
know that the decision would be reversed on appeal.
There is no indication that the Committee, or Congress as a whole,
desired that punitive damages be excluded in cases involving physical injury.
To the contrary, the bill's history makes it abundantly clear that Congress
deliberately chose not to pass on that issue and instead chose to leave that
question to be resolved by the courts.
The Conference bill, as reported on November 21, 1989, contains
inked changes in the printed copy. Four words were deleted in ink, and one
word was added in ink.'31 The unaltered printed copy of the relevant provi-
sion is as follows:
Sec. 7641. Limitation on Section 104 Exclusion.
(a) General Rule.-Section 104(a) (relating to
compensation for injuries or sickness) is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Paragraph (2)
shall not apply to any punitive damages unless such damages
are in connection with a case involving physical injury or
physical sickness."
130. 93 T.C. 330 (1989) (reviewed by the court), rev'd sub nom. Commissioner v.
Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990). The taxpayer in Miller had received both compensatory
and punitive damages in the settlement of a defamation claim.
131. The Conference Committee's version of the amendment is set forth in 224
Daily Tax Report, Special Supplement S-81 (November 22, 1989). The inked changes are
marked on the bill as reproduced therein. The Conference Committee's bill, with those inked
changes shown on the bill, also is reproduced in a bulletin of Prentice Hall that was published
at that time; the bulletin is titled: Revenue Provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1989 (Title VII), and was published as Bulletin 47 Extra on November 28, 1989.
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The printed copy was altered in ink by drawing a line with a deletion symbol
through the words "unless such damages are" and by inserting in ink the
word "not" between the words "case" and "involving." As reported by the
Committee, the amendment appeared as follows:
4 SEC. 7641. LIMITATION ON SECTION 104 EXCLUSION.
5 (a) GENERAL RULE.--sectlon 104(a) (relating to
6 compensation for Injuries or sickness) Is amended by adding
7 at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Paragraph
8 (2) shall not apply to any punitive damages,-
y~~~esin connection with a case involving physical V. 7
10 injury or physical sickness."
The original printed version of the amendment would have made both
a positive and a negative statement, providing that punitive damages in
connection with a physical injury are excluded from income and that punitive
damages not connected with a physical injury are included in income. The
handwritten alteration that was made on the printed text makes only a
negative statement: that punitive damages not connected with a physical
injury are not excluded from income by section 104.
Congress did not inadvertently omit to make an explicit statement that
punitive damages connected with a physical injury are excluded. To the
contrary, the draft containing that statement was altered to avoid taking a
position on that issue. It is clear then that the 1989 amendment has no
bearing on the excludability of punitive damages in cases involving physical
injury.
2. Excludability of Punitive Damages Under Pre-1989 Law.-As the
discussion above demonstrates, it is by no means clear that Congress believed
that section 104(a)(2) applies to punitive damages. Congress may have merely
wished to assure that the courts would not apply the exclusion when nonphys-
ical injuries are involved. When Congress acted, the Tax Court had recently
decided in Miller that punitive damages are excluded by section 104(a)(2).
While the Tax Court's decision was later reversed, Congress must at least
have recognized a possibility of the courts following the Tax Court's lead.
Congress explicitly stated a position on the issue only for cases not involving
physical injuries. It is highly unlikely that the Conference Committee
deliberately struck from the bill any reference to punitive damages acquired
in connection with a physical injury claim because it considered that issue
settled and wished to avoid a redundancy. It is far more likely that Congress
chose to abstain from that issue and leave the matter for the courts to resolve.
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Even if Congress believed in 1989 that punitive damages are
excluded by section 104(a)(2), that belief has little or no significance. In
discussing this issue in Hawkins, the Ninth Circuit quoted the Supreme
Court's statement that "the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous
basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one."' 32 That is especially true
here since there is every reason to doubt that Congress held that opinion.
3. Meaning of "Physical."-The sentence added in 1989 refers to
"physical injury or physical sickness." If the victim of a dignitary tort has a
mental breakdown as a consequence of the humiliation suffered, could section
104(a)(2) apply to punitive damages for the tort because the victim incurred
a "physical sickness"? In such a case, the injury inflicted by the wrongdoer
is not physical, but one of the consequences of that injury is physical.
Given the legislative history of the 1989 amendment, it seems that
Congress intended to bar the exclusion of punitive damages when the tort
itself was not a physical intrusion to the person of the victim. The principal
purpose of the House bill was to bar the exclusion of damages in discrimina-
tion and defamation cases, and the bill as enacted was a compromise that
limited that bar to punitive damages in such cases. The purpose of the
amendment would be frustrated if the exclusion were held to cover punitive
damages in discrimination and defamation cases when the victim became ill
as a consequence of the wrongful act. Regardless of the ultimate resolution
of the issue of whether punitive damages in general are taxable, punitive
damages obtained for a dignitary tort should be taxed.
B. Apart from 1989 Amendment
As discussed above, the 1989 amendment should be construed to
mean only what it says-that the section 104(a)(2) exclusion does not apply
to punitive damages received after July 10, 1989 in cases not involving
physical injuries. The application of the exclusion to other punitive damag-
es-punitive damages received before July 11, 1989 and punitive damages
received on or after that date that are connected with a physical injury-
should be determined without regard to the amendment.
Section 104(a)(2) applies to "any damages" received "on account of
personal injuries or sickness." Under the plain meaning rule of statutory
construction, the reference to "any damages" could be taken literally to apply
132. Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir.) (2-1 decision) (quoting from
United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1961)), cert. denied. 115 S. Ct. 648 (1994).
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to any form of damages, whether or not compensatory.'33 However, within
the four corners of the statute itself, there are signs that the reference to "any
damages" is not as expansive as that term might otherwise suggest. The title
to section 104 is "Compensation for injuries or sickness."'134 Section 104(a)
contains five subparagraphs, each of which describes a type of receipt that is
excluded from income. Each of the four subparagraphs that surround section
104(a)(2) involved compensatory payments. Subparagraph (a)(1) excludes
amounts received under worker's compensation acts as "compensation" for
personal injuries or sickness. Subparagraph (a)(3) excludes certain amounts
received through accident or health insurance for personal injuries or sickness.
Subparagraphs (a)(4) and (5) deal with pensions, annuities, and disability
benefits paid to persons sustaining personal injuries or sickness while serving
in the armed forces or in certain government positions.
When the antecedent to section 104(a)(2) was adopted as part of the
Revenue Act of 1918, the exclusion for personal injury damages was not
contained in a separate subparagraph but was instead combined in a single
paragraph with the exclusion for accident and health insurance receipts and
the exclusion of compensatory payments received under workmen's compen-
sation laws.135 It was later that these three exclusionary provisions were
separated into three subparagraphs. The original inclusion of all three
provisions in one paragraph strengthens the evidence that they have a
common theme-to exclude certain compensatory payments from income.
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Burke 36 provides
comfort to those seeking to bring punitive damages within the statutory
exclusion. Burke establishes that the test of excludability turns on the nature
of the underlying claim (whether it is tort or tort-type), not the nature of the
damages obtained. On the basis of Burke, the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit
have concluded that since the nature of damages are not to be taken into
account, all damages received under a tort or tort-type claim are excluded
from income. 13 However, Burke deals only with the question of what kinds
of claims can qualify for section 104(a)(2) treatment. The Court's acceptance
of the tort or tort-type requirement was a recognition of the need to distin-
guish tort claims from contract claims. The major contribution of Burke is to
133. This view has been adopted by the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit. E.g.,
Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330, 338 (1989), rev'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Miller, 914
F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990); Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994) (2-1 decision),
aff'g 100 T.C. 93 (1993) (reviewed by the court).
134. Emphasis added. A tax statute's title can influence its construction. See House
v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1972).
135. The original 1918 provision is quoted above in the text accompanying note 9.
136. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
137. E.g., Horton, 33 F.3d at 625.
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establish the range of available damages as the standard for whether a claim
is tort-like. Burke does not require the exclusion of all damages in a tort case.
For example, damages compensating for the destruction of property are not
excluded by section 104(a)(2) because they are not received on account of a
personal injury.
Courts favoring the exclusion of punitive damages have noted that in
Burke, the Supreme Court mentioned punitive damages as one of the types
of damages typically provided for tort victims and that the availability of such
damages is one of the factors to be taken into account in determining whether
the range of available damages is sufficiently broad to characterize a claim
as tort-like. But, as Judge Goodwin observed in writing for the majority in
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hawkins, 31 the fact that punitive damages
are an indicator that a claim lies in tort does not mean that a punitive damage
award was obtained on account of a personal injury. The Supreme Court did
not address that issue in Burke.
A crucial hurdle for advocates of the excludability of punitive
damages is whether the damages are received "on account of personal injuries
or sickness," as required by section 104(a)(2). While a personal injury may
be a precondition of a punitive damage award, a victim must also show that
there was egregious behavior on the part of the tortfeasor. The award is not
given for the personal injury, which may only be very slight, but rather is
given to punish and deter the wrongdoer. The requirement that the victim
have incurred a personal injury, however slight, reflects a kind of no-
harm/no-foul sentiment.
In reversing the Tax Court in Miller, the Fourth Circuit stated that
particular damages satisfy the "on account of' requirement only if the
existence of a personal injury is sufficient to enable a court to award the
damages. 139 It is not enough merely to be a necessary element. The court
found the statutory language to be unclear on the issue, but was convinced
by a consideration of the underlying purpose of section 104(a)(2) that more
than a but-for causation is required. The court analogized to the induction of
a baseball player into the Hall of Fame. He could not qualify if he were not
a ballplayer, but he was not elected to the Hall on account of being a
ballplayer.
In rejecting the Fourth Circuit's sufficiency test in Horton, the Sixth
Circuit noted that the existence of a personal injury is not a sufficient basis
for recovery of compensatory damages because the plaintiff must also
establish liability by showing negligence or some wrongful act. 40 However,
138. Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir.) (2-1 decision). ccrt. denied,
115 S. Ct. 648 (1994).
139. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
140. Horton, 33 F.3d at 625.
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section 104(a)(2) presupposes that liability exists. The "on account of
personal injury" language is a limitation on the types of damages obtained
through litigation or settlement that are excludable, denying the exclusion to,
for example, damages for injuries to property. It is reasonable to construe the
"on account of' language as requiring more than a fragile nexus between the
damage award and the personal injury.
The language of the statute is not conclusive as to whether it applies
to punitive damages. The language itself can support either proposition,
although the author believes that a strong case can be made from the statutory
language alone for excluding punitive damages from its protection.
The determination of the scope of the statute, especially when the
language alone does not conclusively resolve the question of its applicability,
should rest on an examination of the policies that justify it. In Part III, the
author examines the policies served by the statutory exclusion, concluding in
Part III.G that none of those policies are served by excluding punitive
damages from income. Unless a valid justification for excluding such
damages can be ascertained, there is no reason to strain to construe the statute
to do so.
In an effort to finesse the issue of whether any policy justification for
the exclusion applies to punitive damages, some courts have asserted that
punitive damages have a compensatory function. 4' The Tax Court stated
in Miller:
Punitive damages have served as a means of compensating
plaintiffs for intangible harm and for costs and attorney's
fees... . Although they may serve these purposes to a lesser
extent now than in the past, the fact that punitive damages
may possess a compensatory aspect renders it reasonable to
afford them the protection of section 104(a)(2).42
The court observes that punitive damages serve to compensate for intangible
harm "to a lesser extent now than in the past" because modern tort law
allows damages for many intangible harms (such as pain and suffering and
emotional distress), leaving no need to provide punitive damages to compen-
sate for such harms. This fact seriously undercuts the contention that a
significant function of punitive damages is to compensate for intangible
injuries.
141. Id.
142. Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330, 341 (1989) (reviewed by the court),
rev'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990). The statement in the
text was quoted with approval by the Sixth Circuit in Horton, 33 F.3d at 629.
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As noted in Part LfI.G, the principal function of punitive damages is
to punish a wrongdoer for outrageous conduct and to deter the wrongdoer and
others from engaging in similar conduct in the future." 3 Whatever minor
compensatory aspect there is to punitive damages is insignificant when
compared to their punitive function. The principal factor a trier of fact should
consider in determining the amount of punitive damages is the degree of
culpability of the wrongdoer. Let the punishment fit the crime. The wrong-
doer's motives also are taken into account. 44 In many jurisdictions, the
wealth of the wrongdoer can be considered.'45
The contention that a victim suffers greater harm from the knowledge
that the wrongdoer's actions are egregious was rejected by Judge Kennedy
in her dissent in Horton."4 The harm that a victim suffers proceeds from
the injury sustained. The evil motivation of the wrongdoer does not aggravate
the victim's injury, but it can affect the amount of anger or outrage that the
victim feels. As noted in Part I.D.2, an award to assuage the victim's anger
or outrage is not truly compensatory. While the extent of the harm suffered
by the victim may be taken into account in determining the amount of
punitive damages, that is not for a compensatory purpose but rather serves as
a means of measuring the culpability of the wrongdoer."4 7 Even the criminal
law looks to the extent of harm done in measuring the severity of the crime
and the amount of punishment that is appropriate.
Whether damages should be characterized for tax purposes as punitive
or compensatory should turn on the criteria utilized, under the law pursuant
to which the damages are awarded, to determine whether to allow the
damages and to set the amount thereof. Nontax laws establish rights, powers,
and interests, but the tax consequence of possessing those rights, powers, and
interests is an issue of tax law. Nontax law controls the nature of the items,
but it cannot control their characterization for tax purposes. The label that
nontax law attaches to a damage award is irrelevant to the tax consequences
of receiving the award. The Supreme Court resolved any doubt concerning
this issue some 54 years ago in Morgan v. Commissioner, where it said:
143. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 (1977), quoted supra note 85.
144. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, cmts. b and e (1977).
145. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, cmt. e (1977) states:
The wealth of the defendant is also relevant, since the purpose of exempla-
ry damages are to punish for a past event and to prevent future offenses,
and the degree of punishment or deterrence resulting from a judgment is
to some extent in proportion to the means of the guilty person.
146. Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 632-33 (6th Cir. 1994).
147. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, cmt. e (1977), quoted supra note 86.
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State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal
revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so created,
shall be taxed. Our duty is to ascertain the meaning of the
words used to specify the thing taxed. If it is found in a
given case that an interest or right created by local law was
the object intended to be taxed, the federal law must prevail
no matter what name is given to the interest or right by state
law. 148
This approach has been followed by subsequent courts. For example, in a
1985 case involving whether a decedent (named Richard H. Black) had a
joint tenancy interest in property for federal estate tax purposes, the Ninth
Circuit said:
When we interpret the tax code, our inquiry focuses on
whether Congress intended to impose a tax on a particular
property right or interest.... State law-in this instance the
law of Arizona-defines the powers that the Blacks could
exercise over the trust property. Arizona law, however, does
not control our ultimate determination. If the statutory
language expresses a Congressional purpose to tax the
decedent's interest, that interest is includable in the decede-
nt's gross estate regardless of whether state law would label
it a "joint tenancy" interest.
49
The label that state law attaches to a damage provision does not control its
characterization for tax purposes, whether the label is given by statute or
judicial decision. The function of a damage award should be determined by
examining the criteria that are used in deciding whether to grant it and for
measuring the amount to be awarded.
In Part fL.E, the author set forth his view that a primary reason for
excluding income-connected damages is to finesse the administrative difficul-
ty of segregating income-connected damages from other compensatory
damages. Does that same consideration apply to punitive damages? Would
the taxation of punitive damages cause a serious administrative burden? One
response to these questions is that Congress deliberately chose to exclude
income-connected damages from income. There is no evidence that Congress
made that choice for punitive damages.
148. 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940).
149. Black v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1985).
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Moreover, the courts and the Service have dealt for years with the
need to segregate punitive and compensatory damages from each other, and
the task of making that allocation has not been burdensome. Courts typically
earmark punitive damages clearly. Settlement agreements often describe how
the division between compensatory and punitive damages is to be made. In
those situations when there has been a lump sum settlement for both punitive
and compensatory damages, and in those cases where the parties' allocation
has been set aside, 50 the courts and the Service have not encountered
significant difficulty in making reasonable allocations.' For example, in
Glenshaw Glass, the landmark case that declared punitive damages to be
taxable, the Tax Court 52 allocated a damage settlement between punitive
and compensatory elements, and the Supreme Court approved that alloca-
tion.5 3 In Coimnissioner v. Miller,'5 where the Fourth Circuit remanded
to the Tax Court for an allocation between punitive and compensatory
damages, the Fourth Circuit listed several alternative means for the Tax Court
to make that allocation. On remand, the Tax Court appeared to have little
difficulty in making the allocation.'
Also, punitive damages can be awarded in nonpersonal injury cases
(e.g., anti-trust cases and fraud cases with corporate plaintiffs), where no
statutory or other exclusion applies. If the burden of distinguishing punitive
from compensatory damages were severe, an exclusion of punitive damages
in personal injury cases would not fully resolve the problem. It is true that in
many nonpersonal injury cases, all damages, whether compensatory or
punitive, are taxable. However, there are many such cases in which the
distinction between punitive and compensatory damages must be made.
Compensatory damages may be taxable only to the extent the amount
recovered exceeds the plaintiff's basis in its goodwill or other damaged
property, a limitation inapplicable to punitive damages. In some cases,
compensatory damages are not taxable, and, in some cases, the income from
compensatory payments is capital gain, while punitive damages are ordinary
income. If it were important to avoid the need to distinguish those two types
of damages, one would expect a cure to be applied to nonpersonal claims.
150. See, e.g., Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116 (1994).
151. The manner in which courts have made an allocation between punitive and
compensatory damages is discussed in Douglas A. Kahn, Federal Income Tax § 2.1341, at
103-05 (3d ed. 1994).
152. Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 860 (1952).
153. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 428 (1955).
154. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
155. Miller v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1884, T.C. Memo (P-H)
93,049 (1993).
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A final point on this issue is that a statutory exclusion from income
of an item that would otherwise be taxable is a departure from the basic tax
scheme. Such departures are not extraordinary in the Code, but their scope
should not be expanded by an especially liberal construction unless the text
of the statute, or policy considerations, or the legislative history of the
provision indicates that a broader reading is warranted. None of those
considerations applies to section 104(a)(2).
VI. AGE DISCRIMINATION
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 156
permits only two types of damages to be awarded for violations of that act.
The victim can obtain backpay, and, if the employer's violation was willful,
liquidated damages equal to the backpay are awarded. Equitable relief can
also be granted. Apart from liquidated damages, the victim cannot recover
damages for noneconomic harm such as emotional distress.
5 7
Because of the change that the Burke decision caused in the analytical
framework employed under section 104(a)(2), pre-Burke decisions on the
excludability of age discrimination damages are not helpful to the current
resolution of that issue and therefore are not discussed here. Since Burke was
decided in 1992, the focus of the courts has been on whether the range of
damages available for victims of age discrimination is sufficiently broad to
make the victim's claim "tort-type." The courts are divided on this issue. The
Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit have held that the range of available
damages provided by ADEA is sufficiently broad to warrant exclusion of
both backpay awards and liquidated damages under that act.' The Seventh
Circuit has held that all ADEA damages are taxable. 5 9 Without writing an
opinion, the Fifth Circuit has affirmed a Tax Court decision holding that
ADEA damages are excluded from income, and the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in that case.160
156. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
157. See, e.g., Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), petition for
cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1994) (No. 94-999). The damage provision of the
ADEA is set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994), which incorporates by reference the damage
provisions of the Fair Labor Standard Act (29 U.S.C. § 216 (1994) [other than subsection (a)
thereof]), except that "liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations."
158. Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed,
63 U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1994) (No. 94-944); Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.
634 (1993) (reviewed by the court), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
159. Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
160. Schleier v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct.
507 (1994).
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The question of whether the range of damages provided by ADEA
is broad enough has centered on the characterization of the provision for
liquidated damages. That liquidated damages are available only when the
employer acted willfully indicates that the damages are designed to punish
wrongful behavior and deter future violations. However, neither the Tax
Court nor the two courts of appeals that have promulgated written opinions
since Burke have characterized the liquidated damage provision as exclusively
punitive in nature.
The Seventh Circuit said in Downey III:
At the present time, there is a division in the courts of
appeals over the character of the ADEA liquidated damages.
Some courts have stated that the character of liquidated
damages is strictly punitive [citations to decisions of the
Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits omitted], while others
have stated that ADEA liquidated damages replace pre-
judgment interest [citations to the First, Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Circuits omitted]. This court [in prior nontax decisions]
adheres to the position that ADEA liquidated damages
replace prejudgment interest.' 6'
The Seventh Circuit held that a claim qualifies as tort or tort-type under
Burke only if nonpecuniary damages are permitted. Having characterized the
liquidated damage provision in ADEA as not being a substitute for nonpecu-
niary losses (it is either punitive or a substitute for prejudgment interest),'6"
the court concluded that an ADEA claim is not a tort or tort-type claim and
that all ADEA damages are taxable.
While the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit have acknowledged that
ADEA liquidated damages serve a "deterrent or punitive purpose," they hold
that the damages also serve a compensatory purpose-to compensate the
victim for nonpecuniary losses that are too obscure and difficult to prove.'
63
The Ninth Circuit's majority opinion in Schmitz explained away the require-
ment of willfulness as follows:
In enacting ADEA, Congress was likely attempting to bal-
ance the need to compensate victims and deter discrimination
with the need to protect businesses from crushing liability.
161. Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836. 839 (7th Cir. 1994). petition for cert.
filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Dec. 5. 1994) (No. 94-999).
162. For the taxability of prejudgment interest included in damage awards for
personal injuries, see Part H.C.
163. Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634, 637 (1993) (reviewed by the court)
(Downey II), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994); Schmitz v. Commissioner. 34 F.3d 790, 794
(9th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S. Nov. 23. 1994) (No. 94-944).
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Unlike the concurrence, we see nothing "peculiar" in
Congress's decision to resolve these competing interests by
compensating victims of willful discrimination at a higher
rate than victims of "nonwillful" discrimination: Congress
has simply decided as a public policy matter that only
victims of willful discrimination should receive obscure and
difficult to prove compensatory damages.' 6
Judge Trott, concurring with the result reached by the majority in Schmitz,
rejected the majority's view that ADEA liquidated damages serve a compen-
satory purpose. Judge Trott stated that the legislative history of the ADEA
and the decisions of courts of appeals in nontax ADEA cases (including two
decisions by the Ninth Circuit itself) establish that the ADEA liquidated
damage provision is a punitive measure. Judge Trott quoted the Supreme
Court's statement in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, that "[t]he
legislative history of the ADEA indicates that Congress intended for liquidat-
ed damages to be punitive in nature."' 65 Despite his repudiation of the
majority's characterization, Judge Trott concurred with the result because of
his belief that section 104(a)(2) encompasses punitive damages.
66
The requirement that a claim be tort or tort-type has its roots in the
regulations. 167 In Burke, the Supreme Court merely accepted that regulatory
condition. As previously noted, the apparent purpose of this requirement is
to preclude the exclusion from applying to recoveries under claims grounded
in contract, which are commercially oriented. Unfortunately, the distinction
between tort and contract claims is blurred, and the characterization of a
claim as one or the other is often arbitrary. 168 In Burke, the Supreme Court
apparently adopted the range-of-available-damages test in order to provide a
standard for determining excludability that separated personal, noncommercial
injuries from commercial ones more effectively than does the tort/contract
dichotomy. The Court may also have believed that this test is easier to
administer than one that requires an inquiry into the legislative purpose for
granting a right to damages.
When the Supreme Court established the range-of-available-damages
test in Burke, it is doubtful that the Court anticipated that lower courts would
164. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 795.
165. 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985).
166. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 796. Judge Trott had previously dissented in Hawkins, the
case in which the Ninth Circuit held that punitive damages are taxable. Hawkins v. United
States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 1994).
167. Regs. § 1.104-1(c).
168. For example, some breaches of contract have been deemed to be so reprehensi-
ble that they amount to a tort. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.17 n.19 (2d ed.
1990) and cases cited therein.
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make the tax treatment of damages turn on speculation as to a legislature's
underlying motive for adopting a provision under which damages were
granted. The Court likely assumed that it would only be necessary to
determine what remedies are available for a type of claim. The problem with
liquidated damage provisions is that they may serve several functions-some
of them punitive and some compensatory. In the case of the ADEA liquidated
damage provision, the prevailing nontax authorities (including decisions of
the Supreme Court) seem to favor either a punitive characterization or one of
prejudgment interest. In either case, it seems that the range of damages is not
broad enough to satisfy Burke. In view of the commercial nature of the injury
(the claim arises from wrongful failure, because of the victim's age, to hire,
promote, or retain the victim as an employee or a wrongful denial of some
other employment benefit), the policy justifications for excluding personal
injury damages are generally inapplicable to the ADEA. Since the compensa-
tory nature of ADEA liquidated damages is doubtful, and since the policy
justification for excluding ADEA damages is weak, ADEA damages should
be taxed.
In any event, if the courts are required to speculate as to the motive
for the adoption of statutory provisions for damage awards, the administrative
feasibility that the range of available damages test likely was designed to
provide is lost. It should not be necessary to obtain a psychological profile
of the legislators who adopted a provision to determine its tax characteriza-
tion.
The difficulties encountered in determining whether ADEA damages
are excludable are attributable to the inadequacy of the standards of tort-type
claims and "range of available damages" that were adopted by the Supreme
Court in Burke. In Part VII, the author discusses the difficulties caused by
those standards and questions whether they lead to rational distinctions. For
example, as previously noted, federal employees are barred from receiving
liquidated damages under the ADEA,169 raising the possibility that the
ADEA damages of all employees other than federal employees will be
excluded from income-thereby doubly punishing the Federal employee.
VII. OPERATION OF BuRKE STANDARDS
The Burke holdings-following the regulations in limiting the section
104(a)(2) exclusion to recoveries on tort or tort-type claims and defining "tort
or tort-type" to require a range of available damages-have not eased the
administration of the exclusion, have led to incongruous differences in tax
169. Smith v. Office of Personnel Management, 778 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1985),
discussed supra text accompanying note 118.
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consequences, and may induce persons injured in employment or other
commercial disputes arising out of contract breach to forego settlements in
order to bring tort actions that might yield tax-free recoveries. Similarly,
employees offered termination payments as an inducement to retire may
negotiate with their employers to have the payments characterized as
settlements for tortious injuries.
The differentiation between the types of claims for which damages
are excluded and those for which damages are taxable appears arbitrary.
Compensatory damages received for race-based discrimination under 42
U.S.C. section 1981 and for disparate treatment discrimination under Title VII
are excluded from income, as are compensatory damages under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act.170 However, compensatory damages for disparate
impact discrimination under Title VII are taxable, and it is unsettled whether
the damages received for ADEA claims by plaintiffs other than Federal
employees are excludable, although it is clear that the Burke standards require
the inclusion in income of ADEA damages obtained by a Federal employee.
Even the possibility that all plaintiffs other than Federal employees can
exclude ADEA damages from income, but Federal employees cannot,
demonstrates that the Burke standards are seriously flawed.
Damages for wrongful discharge (a truly commercial violation) can
be excluded if the jurisdiction provides a tort action for the violation, but
damages obtained on a contract theory because of a wrongful discharge are
taxable.' 71 In McKay, 72 where the plaintiff brought suit for both wrongful
discharge and breach of an employment contract, the Tax Court held that the
damages obtained for the former were excluded from income, but the
damages for breach of the contract were taxable.
Where a breach of contract is one that is likely to cause the plaintiff
to incur serious emotional disturbance, courts have allowed recovery for pain
and suffering.'73 In such cases, the range of damages available on the
contract claim seem to be sufficient to characterize it as tort-type under
Burke. If so, under the approach that some courts (including the Tax Court)
have taken, all damages for breach might be excluded from income. This
possibility indicates just how unworkable the Burke standards are. Moreover,
the attempt to find a standard that distinguishes tort claims from contract
claims seems to have failed.
170. Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61.
171. See McKay v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 465 (1994).
172. Id. For a discussion of McKay, see supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
173. See Farnsworth, supra note 168, § 12.17.
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Splits in authority have developed since Burke on the application of
the exclusion to two significant items-punitive damages and prejudgment
interest included in personal injury awards.'74
Another problem that may have arisen as a consequence of Burke is
that employment disputes that might have been settled may instead be
channelled to the courts in the hope of having settlements characterized as
excludable tort damages. The author has no empirical evidence that this has
occurred,175 but accounts of such occurrences are circulating among some
law firms. These accounts may not be accurate, but the availability of that
course of action seems so tempting that it is reasonable to expect it to be
pursued.
Employers often try to buy-out older employees by offering financial
inducements for retirement. Employers often require employees accepting
such offers to sign releases for any claims that might exist against the
employers for discriminatory treatment. The requirement of such a release
may only be a cautionary measure, and it usually does not cause the transac-
tion to be treated in whole or in part as a settlement of a tort claim.'76
However, it seems likely that knowledgeable attorneys will counsel their
clients to lodge tort claims in such cases and negotiate with the employer to
structure the settlement as a payment of tort damages rather than as a termi-
nation payment. A recent commentary on this topic essentially recommends
that procedure.'
Most of the problems created by the Burke standards could be
resolved by limiting section 104(a)(2) to damages arising from claims based
on physical injury. No standard will preclude difficult issues from arising, but
the requirement of a physical injury would go far to minimize administrative
difficulties and make a more rational division of damages between those that
are taxable and those that are excluded. In Burke, the Supreme Court rejected
Justice Scalia's proposal to restrict section 104(a)(2) to cases involving
physical injury, 178 but this issue will soon return to the Court.' Perhaps,
174. See Parts 1I.B, II.C.
175. However, the facts of the recent case of Taggi v. United States, 35 F.3d 93 (2d
Cir. 1994), lend credibility to the suggestion that this is taking place. See also Loren C.
Rosenzweig, Careful Planning May Establish Excludability of Damages Awarded For Age
Discrimination, 81 J. Tax'n 254 (1994) (suggesting that settlements for employment
terminations should be structured to maximize the amount characterized as a settlement of tort
claims).
176. See Taggi, 35 F.3d at 93.
177. See Rosenzweig, supra note 175, at 258.
178. In Downey III, Judge Flaum expressed his admiration for Justice Scalia's
cogent argument for his proposal. Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 1994),
petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1994) (No. 94-999).
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in light of what has transpired in the wake of Burke, the Court will reconsider
the position it took in that case and either construe section 104(a)(2) as
limited to physical injuries or adopt some other limiting rule.
179. Schleier v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct.
507 (1994).
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